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ABSTRACT
Strategic Choices in Foreign Aid
by
Tobias Heinrich
This dissertation addresses three important questions surrounding the politics of
foreign aid, namely what leads to its provisions by donor countries, and what are
some of its consequences on those receiving it. Using arguments rooted in political
economy models and large-N statistics, this dissertation provides three core findings:
(i) Foreign aid can be driven by heterogenous motives in the donor country. (ii) This
heterogeneity determines whether a donor lives up to the promises over foreign aid
that it makes. (iii) Inflows of foreign aid tend to restrain the government’s propensity
to engage in killings.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
At a first glance, foreign aid appears to be a weird policy. If one reads a politi-
cian’s remarks on any prominent policy, such as education, taxes, or immigration,
then the virtues of the proposal are touted with respect to (prospective) voters’ im-
provement in well-being. A crude, knee-jerk analysis would posit that these voters
appreciate these policies and would therefore reward the politician with a vote, bribe,
or campaign contribution. It should be readily apparent how foreign aid di↵ers as
its benefits to people literally elsewhere are praised by the politician. This raises
the question of whether aid is just di↵erent from everything else or whether that
knee-jerk analysis is just fundamentally o↵ the mark. This dissertation sides with
the latter, and investigates how aid functions from a general perspective of political
policies. What makes the analysis of foreign aid from this angle a fascinating in-
tellectual endeavor is precisely the fact that the former perspective carries so much
appeal among people, politicians, as well as scholars.
Studying foreign aid is not only worthy of an intellectual endeavor, but also car-
ries dramatic real-life importance as the stakes are high. Despite the stunning gains
2in human welfare in some places of the world, many places have failed to improve
people’s lives (e.g. Collier 2007, Clark 2008, Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). Richer
states, celebrities, international organizations, and thousands non-governmental or-
ganizations respond to this rich-poor disparity by devoting considerable money and
time to seemingly address the poverty. Therefore, the importance of foreign aid
comes not only from the obvious first-order concern about human su↵ering, but also
from the second-order opportunity costs from those seeking to solve the first-order
problems.1
Systematic international e↵orts to address the lack of development have been
around for decades now, but their track record is far from stellar. While some
question whether foreign aid can succeed in helping development (Bauer 1984), the
evidence for consistent improvement in lives of people is mixed at best (Rajan &
Subramanian 2008, Doucouliagos & Paldam 2009, Easterly 2009).
The unsatisfactory e↵ectiveness of foreign aid should lead to one of two things.
Foreign aid could be abandoned, and the resources should be focuses on policies that
appear more promising. For example, Clemens (2011) suggests that more lenient
immigration policies by rich states should entail economic gains for the poor that
exceed by leaps and bounds any gains that foreign aid could bring about. Alterna-
1 Consider whether the poor of the world are better o↵ by Bill Gates spending his wealth as a
philanthropist or as a businessman and investor. I believe the answer is far from obvious.
3tively, the current practice of foreign aid could be reformed. The first option seems
highly doubtful to be viable in the short run.
In order for reforms to aid to have the chance to actually achieve something, the
workings of current aid need to be understood thoroughly. After all, this is far from
straightforward. Let me illustrate this by contrasting the practice of foreign aid with
an everyday action such as the purchase of some good at a store.
The steps involved in an everyday purchase are well-known. You enter the store,
roam around, grab an item that strikes your interest, perhaps read up online reviews
on it, proceed to the checkout, pay, and then go home and use the item. If the item
turns out to be defective or is even just di↵erent from what was hoped for, the store
will likely replace it.
Everything that makes this vendor-customer relationship so simple and e cient
is absent when people’s empathy for others’ misery brings about foreign aid. It is dif-
ficult to judge whether a given aid package is working (Rajan & Subramanian 2008,
Doucouliagos & Paldam 2009, Wright & Winters 2010), there is little immediate
contact between those who support foreign aid, those that decide over its imple-
mentation, and those for whom it is ostensibly intended (Nielson & Tierney 2003,
Easterly 2006, Easterly 2010), and there is sparse (yet increasing) information about
the details of aid (Easterly & Williamson 2011).
4Further, as passionate as people can get about certain items (such as exquisite
food and electronic gadgets), emotions are stirred much more when confronted with
the poverty elsewhere which aid aims to address (Singer 2009). Precisely because
foreign aid is often appreciated due its titular and ostensible goals without supporters
having a real stake in outcomes, people pay little attention to details. In contrast,
the consumer usually watches carefully what he gets for his money.
As the stakes are high in terms of human well-being and spending of taxpayers’
money, emotions are charged, and matters are massively more complicated than
buying an everyday item, it behooves scholars to develop a deeper understanding of
the inner workings of foreign aid. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this end.
Policies and Politics over Domestic Issues and Aid Policy
As illustrative as it is to compare buying some simple item with the superficial man-
ifestations of foreign aid, I am setting up an easily combustable straw man; I am
comparing a market transaction with a political outcome. A fairer and comple-
mentary comparison is between foreign aid and domestic politics. Let’s return as a
starting point to the crude, knee-jerk analysis from above.
A first stab at a closer comparison might to consider some examples of the rhetor-
ical choices for aid and domestic policies. We might as well start with the onset of
5modern foreign aid, namely when George C. Marshall spoke at Harvard University
on June 5, 1947.2 He spoke of the dreary postwar circumstances in Europe and how
the United States could help. It was a necessity to do so, he opined. Aside from a
vague reference to “the economy of the United States” of a weak postwar economy
in Europe, the speech calls for assistance by the people of the United States to help
the people of Europe. Helping them was tantamount to a moral imperative.
Things have not changed much. In the run-up to the 2012 U.S. presidential
elections, the two main contenders, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, gave speeches
on development issues at the Clinton Global Initiative. Obama spoke of modern
day slavery and the United States’ duty to assist ridding the world of it. Romney
spoke almost exclusively about how U.S. assistance could boost commerce in other
countries and how that would benefit citizens.3
Just as Marshall’s, needless to say that Obama’s and Romney’s speeches were not
without some (thin) references to potential benefits to U.S. citizens. Romney spoke
without further elaboration that assistance ought “to foster a substantial United
States strategic interest, be it military, diplomatic, or economic” and that aid may
2 The text of the speech is available on the website of the OECD under http://www.oecd.org/
general/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm [accessed February
11, 2013].
3 Obama’s and Romney’s speeches are available at http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0912/81655.html and http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/09/25/
text-of-romneys-address-to-clinton-global-initiative/, respectively.
6open doors for U.S. businesses. However, these references were short.
In this light, consider how the same politicians consistently and lavishly praise
their domestic policies’ e↵ects for their voters. Romney promised in his acceptance
speech at the Republican National Convention expanded options for education for
children, new trade agreements which he “will make work for America,” not to raise
taxes on middle class citizens, and to cut taxes on U.S. businesses so that they can be
“America’s engine of job growth.”4 In his acceptance speech, Obama said that he, as
the president, “took on [an education] system that wasted billions of taxpayer dollars
on banks and lenders” so that tuition was lower now, and he planned on reducing
carbon emissions as they were connected to floods and draughts, which threatened
children’s future.5
Taking the two politicians’ at face value, then aid is supposed to benefit citizens
of recipient countries, none of whom can vote. Yet every other policy is supposed to
benefit voters. Interestingly, this dualism is echoed in the scholarly work on foreign
aid on one side, and on domestic politics on the other. For instance, some examples
of scholarly work on the latter find that politicians exert a lot of e↵ort to stay in





7to their constituents (Bickers & Stein 2000), use declarations of natural disasters
as electoral instruments (Reeves 2011, Bechtel & Hainmueller 2011), invoke rhetoric
fitting the constituents, respond to public opinion (Lax & Phillips 2009), claim credit
for appropriated projects (Mayhew 2004, Grimmer, Messing & Westwood 2012),
and so forth. While obviously not exhaustive, sheer benevolence, as present in the
rhetoric on foreign aid, appears to be as uncommon in the scholarly literature as in
the rhetoric on these policies.
In contrast, countless works on foreign aid speak of particular “biases” of donors;
that is, donors might bias aid allocations away from development-oriented patterns.
For instance, voting patterns in the United Nations (UN) between the recipient and
donor and the recipient’s presence on the UN Security Council have been shown
to generate more aid outlays (Alesina & Dollar 2000, Kuziemko & Werker 2006).
Each set of authors laments, probably justifiably, that these aspects have little to
do with the development impetus which aid ostensibly serves. Even in late 2012, an
American Economic Review article could express an understated astonishment that
donors would disregard development concerns and increase aid for friendly regimes
in election times (Faye & Niehaus 2012).
A presumed dualism is always curious, perhaps unsettling, in absence of a good
justification for it. Scholars in the political economy vein do not presuppose such
8divergent assumptions, but assume that politicians act the same regardless if the
policy in question is about taxes, defense, health, or foreign aid. As a matter of fact,
this literature takes as a starting point what Marshall castigates as o↵ensive to the
noble undertaking by the United States. He warned that “[...] governments, political
parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom
politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.”
Political economy work does not suggest that donors seek to “perpetuate human
misery” in recipient countries,6 but it seeks to understand policies by assuming that
human misery is something from which actors can benefit. For instance, Powers,
Leblang & Tierney (2010) demonstrate that legislators are more likely to vote for
the expansion of aid if their districts gets more aid contracts. Relatedly, Milner &
Tingley (2010) find that, since aid is a giving away of capital, owners of capital stand
to gain the most from aid, and therefore legislators, whose constituents have capital
abundance, are more likely to vote for aid. In Marshall’s eyes, such legislators should
“encounter the opposition of the United States.”
Other studies show that, what others see as “biases” in aid allocation patterns,
such as being on the UN Security Council, are actually optimal features once we
consider foreign aid to be a tool to politicians’ ends (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith
6 An exception might be Bueno de Mesquita & Downs (2006) who argue and show that Western
countries have an incentive to keep other countries’ institutions minimal. In turn, this a↵ects
the e↵ectiveness of development aid of these Western countries (Wright 2010).
92009a). For instance, Eisensee & Stro¨mberg (2007) show that the United States only
provides assistance for disasters if there is news coverage. The real su↵ering after
disaster matters only if it is on the reel and thus can honored by voters. Similarly,
di↵erent ideologies of incumbent parties a↵ect the government’s aid volume(Tingley
2010, Goldstein & Moss 2005). If aid was truly congruent with politicians’ rhetoric
about it, then none of these just-mentioned features should be present.
Plan of Dissertation
This dissertation follows the political economy notion to study what actors do and
not what they say in order to understand the workings of a phenomenon.7 It builds
rigorously from assumptions about answers to the cui bono question asked with
respect to foreign aid. Unsurprisingly from the standpoint of the bigger work in
political economy, the benefactors are the decision-makers’ constituents.
In Chapter 2, When Is Foreign Aid Selfish, When Is It Selfless?, I attempt to
reconcile the long-running debate over whether giving foreign aid is indeed a selfish or
selfless task by donor governments. Assuming that decision-makers are just interested
in satisfying the public, I show that foreign aid can be driven by either impetus.
7 A note on the separate chapters is in order. Chapter 2, When Is Foreign Aid Selfish, When Is
It Selfless?, is a minimally modified version of an article that is bound to appear in 2013 in
The Journal of Politics. For future versions of the other two substantive chapters, consult the
author’s website under www.theinrich.net.
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Foreign aid is driven by selfish motives when the recipient country has a policy
under its control that is of interest to the donor leader’s constituents. Likewise, if
those constituents learn about misery elsewhere, then it is indeed in the decision-
maker’s interest to also give aid. Whereas the former logic is at the heart of Bueno
de Mesquita & Smith (2009a), who forcefully argue that aid is exclusively a selfish
endeavor, the model in Chapter 2 shows that it need not be and that it is a special
case of how societal interests can a↵ect foreign aid.
Even though I argue above to study what actors do and not what they say, the
divergence of deeds and words can be salient as well. One particular case is the often-
observed failure by donors to deliver on foreign aid pledges. Previously, scholars have
argued that such shortfall is detrimental to the e↵orts of recipient governments to
spur economic growth (Lensink & Morrissey 2000). Chapter 3 explores the Strategic
Reneging on Foreign Aid Promises which, as I will argue, lies at the heart of the
issue. Building on the theoretical insights of Chapter 2, I show that these hetero-
geneous motives (selfish, selfless) lead to very di↵erent predictions about whether
a donor honors its commitments on foreign aid. The more aid serves to influence
policies under the control of the recipient, the more the donor has incentives to do as
promised. However, when aid was promised to help out those in misery, say, after a
disaster, the donor leader can exploit the quickly fading attention by the news media
11
and thereby the citizens. As pledges get televised, but the minutiae of the delivery
do not, a donor leader has incentives to renege on promises.
The first two substantive chapters are concerned with what gives rise to foreign
aid. In Does Foreign Aid Cause Governmental Killings?, I consider one particularly
salient consequence of foreign aid. Models of political economy have long explored
numerous political e↵ects from aid, such as corruption, political entrenchment of
elites, etc. Interestingly, similar thinking leads to the prediction that foreign aid
should impel governments to kill people or remove them from political life (Esteban,
Morelli & Rohner 2010, Besley & Persson 2011). Using powerful statistical model
from the machine learning literature to deal with issues of confoundedness (Chipman,
George & McCulloch 2010), I estimate actually a negative causal e↵ect of foreign aid
on the recipient government’s propensity to engage in killings. While surprising, in
light of the greater body of work on the relationship between governmental resources
and violence, this estimate should not be taken as the last word on the topic.
This dissertation will proceed as follows. Each of the three substantive chapter
will appear in turn. As this dissertation is composed of separate, self-contained
substantive chapters, a certain redundancy in arguments and details of measures




When Is Foreign Aid Selfish, When Is It Selfless?
2.1 Introduction
Why is foreign aid given?1 Is its allocation driven by donor interests and does it
merely act as a bribe? Or is it determined by donors’ selflessness, concerns for global
justice, and recipient needs? In spite of a large number of studies, decisive evidence
for either view is still elusive.2 In light of that, continuing to ask whether foreign aid
is given for one or the other reason may not be very fruitful.
It stands to reason that, perhaps, both presumed motives are at play simulta-
1 Yoshi Kobayashi and Cli↵ Morgan were very generous with their time and thoughts on this
chapter. Additionally comments were provided by Patrick Brandt, Songying Fang, Susan
Hyde, Ashley Leeds, Matt Loftis, Carla Martinez Machain, Elena McLean, Jim Morrow, Laura
Seelkopf, Bob Stein, Randy Stevenson, Mike Tierney, Rob Walker, Matt Winters, Dan Zac-
cariello, the editors of the JOP, and three anonymous reviewers as well as by participants at
presentations at the Forschungskolloquium at the Universita¨t Regensburg, 2012 Texas Trian-
gle Conference, 2011 Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, 2011 European Political
Science Association Meeting, 2010 Polmeth Summer Conference, and at various instances of
Rice’s IR Lunch. An online appendix is available at http://journals.cambridge.org/jop;
the replication package can be found on the author’s website at www.theinrich.net upon
publication.
2 Among many others, see Pilvin (1962), McKinley & Little (1979), Maizels & Nissanke (1984),
Lumsdaine (1993), Hook, Taylor & Schraeder (1998), Alesina & Dollar (2000), Neumayer
(2003), Berthe´lemy & Tichit (2004), Milner & Tingley (2010), and van der Veen (2011).
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neously. This is possible as neither the selfish nor the selfless approach to foreign
aid necessarily contradicts the other. I propose reframing the main question of this
age-old debate by instead of asking whether aid is selfless or selfish, asking when it
is either. To this end, I provide a formal model of foreign aid allocations in which
selfish and selfess motives may at the same time a↵ect the aid flows. Crucially, my
modeling reveals under which circumstances aid is expected to be driven by either
motive.
Following the formal model by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a), I model
the leaders of the donor and recipient countries bargain over foreign aid in order to
better satisfy their political support groups, the “winning coalitions.” Both leaders’
winning coalitions derive utility from domestic policies and from some policy that
might be subjected to bargaining between the donor and the recipient. Additionally,
the donor’s winning coalition has a preference for its leader to distribute aid in a
humanitarian way. Unlike domestic policies that are often readily observable (such
as hospitals, tax levels, and roads), the donor’s winning coalition is usually in the
dark about foreign aid policies. In order for the humanitarian preferences to a↵ect
the leader’s aid decisions, the winning coalition needs to know the extent to which
the leader’s e↵orts comport with its humanitarian ideals. I argue that news coverage
about the recipient conditions the extent to which the winning coalition can evaluate
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and thus credit the leader for helping out poorer countries. This, in turn, together
with incentives to buy policy concessions from the recipient country jointly shapes
the donor leader’s optimal foreign aid allocation.
The theoretical model predicts distinct mechanisms behind any observed foreign
aid allocation. First, foreign aid can be driven exclusively by media-induced aware-
ness of conditions in the recipient country if policy concessions are of little interest to
the donor. Second, when the donor values policy concessions from a recipient coun-
try, the two countries strike a deal and the observed amount of aid is determined
through bargaining. Third, if a recipient country is in misery and the news covers it
heavily, then the donor leader can reap image gains from being seen as acting in a
humanitarian manner. Therefore, the leader provides even more aid than necessary
to buy a policy concession. Fourth, if the donor has little interest in the recipient’s
policies and the leader can gain little from being seen helping it, then aid just drains
governmental resources and therefore is not given.
These mechanisms correspond to familiar arguments in the aid literature. How-
ever and most importantly, my model also predicts when each of these mechanisms
apply so that I can test when aid is selfless and when it is selfish. As commonly
used statistical approaches fail for this sort of question, I turn to a variant of finite
mixtures, namely the mixtures-of-experts, which lets me model when the separate
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mechanisms apply (Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter 2006, Imai & Tingley 2011). I use data
on the foreign aid of seven OECD donors to 99 recipients, spanning the years 1995
through 2003, as well as an original dataset on news coverage of recipients in the
donor countries. The statistical models provide evidence that donors tend to provide
aid in a way that is consistent with my model: bargaining between the donor and
the recipient becomes more likely when the recipient has policies that are of interest
to the donor, and humanitarian-motivated aid is more likely to take place as news
of and misery in a recipient country increase.
In the next section, I review the previous work on foreign aid allocation. Next, I
introduce the theory by first laying out how people form opinions on policy on which
they have weak factual knowledge, and by then stating the formal model. After
deriving the predictions, I describe how I test my predictions using the mixture-of-
experts model. The results and conclusions follow.
2.2 Why Give Foreign Aid?
The two central findings in the literature on foreign aid allocations are that more
aid goes to recipients who have some “strategic importance” to the donor and to
those states receiving greater news coverage in the donor country. Further, countless
surveys show that citizens are supportive of humanitarian motivated aid giving, but
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wary of aid given for strategic purposes.
It is by now accepted knowledge that donors provide more aid to countries that
have some sort of “importance” to them even though the precise concepts vary.
Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2007, 2009), whose work serves as a basis for this
paper, provide a deeper explanation of how these findings can be interpreted. They
argue that donor and recipient leaders may collude to improve their chances to remain
in o ce by engaging in an aid-for-policy deal. That perspective echoes Morgenthau
(1962)’s adage that aid is little more than a bribe. Providing aid reduces what the
donor leader can spend on domestic goods, but the gains from the obtained policy
concessions can outweigh these losses. An analogous logic applies to the recipient
leader who may benefit from the increase in resources from received aid, but has
to move a policy away from the bliss point. The variables capturing the notions of
strategic importance in older work are operationalizations of where the donor leader
covets a change in policy.
The exclusive focus on aid-for-policy deals makes it di cult for the model to of-
fer an interpretation of two other robust findings in the literature, namely that news
coverage of and natural disasters in the recipient country are associated with sub-
stantially increased foreign aid (e.g. Payaslian 1996, Van Belle, Rioux & Potter 2004,
Drury, Olson & Van Belle 2005, Stro¨mberg 2007). First, the most obvious interpre-
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tation may be to treat news coverage as a proxy for a donor’s salience. However,
in their model, saliency is over a policy concession (such as United Nations Security
Council votes or domestic policies in a former colony). Such concessions should not
become more valuable as news thereof increases. Second, sudden increases in aid
after disasters pose another problem. The model by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith
explains the bargaining outcomes through rather sluggish variables such as institu-
tions, saliency for policy concesions, and governmental resources. Due to their slow
movements, these variables are ill-suited to explain such rapid changes in aid.
How has previous literature explained such aid spikes? Lumsdaine (1993) argues
that aid allocation is (also) driven by citizen’s humanitarian concerns. He shows that
citizens care about human su↵ering elsewhere and wish that their government helps
out with aid. Such seemingly selfless preferences are found consistently in opinion
surveys.3 Lumsdaine goes on to provide evidence that these preferences are reflected
in donors’ actual aid allocations through two channels. First, governments require
personnel comprised of college educated and idealistic people who also happen to
be those that often support development aid. Second, various groups (churches,
intellectuals) support development aid. Beyond these suggestions, Lumsdaine o↵ers
little to connect opinions and aid outcomes.
3 See in particular surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign A↵airs (1975–1999) and by the
Chicago Council on Global A↵airs (2002). Similar results are found in Eurobarometer and
OECD surveys (OECD 2003, Eurobarometer 2009); see Riddell (2007, Ch. 7) for an overview.
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Douglas Van Belle and co-authors theorize more about this news-aid nexus (see
in particular Van Belle, Rioux & Potter (2004)). In Van Belle’s model, leaders devise
policies such that they help their reelection. Part of citizens’s decision is whether the
leader deals e↵ectively with foreign policy issues. The leader tasks the bureaucracy
to carry out the implementation of an aid policy which is one part of the foreign
policy dealings. As the public rarely gathers first-hand information about the rest of
the world, the bureaucracy simply monitors the public’s source of information and
provides aid in proportion to the news coverage. This o↵ers not only an explanation
for the association between news coverage and increased aid, but for increases, even
spikes, in aid in the wake of disasters (Drury, Olson & Van Belle 2005, Eisensee &
Stro¨mberg 2007, Potter & Van Belle 2009).
With the approaches by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith on one side, and by Van
Belle and Lumsdaine on the other, the literature presents two separate views to
explain these main empirical patterns. It is noteworthy that the models do not nec-
essarily contradict each other and that each model’s weakness could be ameliorated
by considering the other’s strengths. In the next section, I present such a theoretical
model that builds on the strengths of the models by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith
and by Van Belle. This new model can tell us not only about the amount of foreign
aid, but also when an aid-for-policy impetus and when humanitarian concerns give
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rise to foreign aid.
2.3 Bargained Aid and News Coverage
Before introducing the formal model, which builds on the work by Bueno de Mesquita
& Smith (2009a) but also allows for citizens’ humanitarian concerns to matter, I
outline how I assume that citizens learn about their country’s aid policies. This
confronts the fact that people generally have little factual knowledge about politics,
and likely even far less about aid.
I model the interaction between a donor and a recient leader who bargain over
an aid-for-policy deal with the goal to improve their respective odds of staying in
o ce. Each leader’s survival is dependent upon on how much utility each can bestow
upon their respective winning coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson &
Morrow 2003b). Shifting the focus to the donor for now, the donor leader’s winning
coalition receives two benefits from any aid allocation, namely the bought policy
concession and the induced utility from helping others; I will call this latter part
“warm glow” at times (Andreoni 1990). However, a lack of factual knowledge of aid
hinders the straightforward evaluation of these benefits.
First, if aid buys a policy concession from the recipient country, then the winning
coalition need not have factual knowledge of aid in order to experience utility from it.
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For example, if a donor buys access to natural resources on behalf of its firms, then
such firms might pay higher wages, employ more people, or give higher dividends.
Even though it does not know that foreign aid cause the e↵ects, the winning coalition
appreciates a marginally improved economy. It gains utility from the e↵ects of aid.
Second, the utility from warm glow is quite di↵erent as no consequences of aid are
experienced routinely; the e↵ects play out elsewhere. Therefore, it is essential that
the winning coalition learns about aid e↵orts in order to appreciate them. Unlike in
the broader foreign policy (e.g. Rosenau 1961, Baum & Potter 2008) and political
economy literatures (e.g. Majumdar, Mani & Mukand 2004, Mani & Mukand 2007,
Prat & Stro¨mberg 2011), this latter connection between policies and learning about
them has been explored less in the foreign aid literature (see for a notable exception
Milner 2006). Therefore, a more thorough discussion is merited.
Zaller’s work on survey responses and mass political opinion provides a theory
that allows me to connect the assumption that people have a preference over aid
for humanitarian purposes, the volume of news, and the mechanism by which aid
e↵orts a↵ect the survival of the incumbent (Zaller & Feldman 1992, Zaller 1996).
The core of the argument is simple: When people evaluate an issue about which
they have weak factual information, such as foreign aid, they take a random draw
from remembered messages about the issue. The primary source of these messages is
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the news media, as many scholars including Zaller point out (e.g. Lodge, Steenbergen
& Brau 1995, Delli Carpini 2000, Baum & Potter 2008). As the volume of available
news rises for a particular country, people should receive more information connecting
the country’s poverty and the extent of the foreign aid e↵orts. Zaller argues that
citizens store such messages and draw from them when it is time to evaluate how
humanitarian the donor leader’s aid policies were. It is import to note the interactive
e↵ects between news volume, a recipient’s misery, and foreign aid reinforce each other.
For example, assume there are two countries with equal levels of misery and receiving
the same foreign aid. Aid to the one with the higher news coverage contributes more
to the winning coalition’s utility. Having specified the connection between largely
unobserved aid policies, citizens’ preferences, and the evaluation of the leader, we can
now turn to the formal model which incorporates this as well as the aid-for-policy
causal mechanisms.
2.3.1 The Model
The foundation of the model is the aid-for-policy game by Bueno de Mesquita &
Smith (2009a). The model is a game between the leaders of the donor and recipi-
ent countries as well as their respective winning coalitions. Denote the donor and
recipient countries as A and B, and their leaders as AL and BL, respectively. Each
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countries’ leader needs to ensure the support of his winning coalition in order to
hold onto o ce. As leaders solely derive utility if they are in o ce, they focus on the
winning coalition’s utility from enacted policies. The recipient and donor winning
coalitions each care about three things: domestic public and private goods, the va-
lence for the leader, and the status of one particular policy. In addition, the donor’s
winning coalition cares about the warm glow from its country’s aid allocation.4 This
last component is a novel extension that captures the humanitarian motives behind
aid (Lumsdaine 1993, Singer 2009).
First, each winning coalition gains utility from domestic public (g) and private (z)
goods provided by the respective leaders (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003b). Private
goods are targeted to particular individuals, such as bribes, whereas public goods are
untargeted and assumed to benefit all people (e.g. schools, hospitals). The utility of




z. There are fixed resources (R)
available which impose a budget constraint, pg +Wz  R, where p is the price for
public goods and the size of the winning coalition (W ) acts as the implicit price of
the private goods. Second, the winning coalition also has some valence for the leader
which is independent of all other sources of utility. One may think of special ethnic
ties, for example. The winning coalition knows and the leader is uncertain about
4 By design, these four components of utility are non-overlapping such that foreign aid can be
studied more closely.
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this valence. It is left unmodeled and is represented as a random variable ✓ which
has full support and a cumulative distribution, F (X).
Third, the winning coalition receives utility from the policy over which the two
leaders bargain. The policy is under BL’s control and takes on one of two values,
y 2 {0, 1}. The model treats the particular policy as if it were a public good (or
bad) for the countries in the sense that all people enjoy it. The winning coalition of
the donor most prefers y to be 1, but incurs  A in disutility if y = 0; B’s coalition
would like to see it at 0, but incurs disutility of  B if y = 1.
Fourth, and this applies only to the donor, the winning coalition cares about how
humanitarian the aid allocation to B is. This is novel over the original aid-for-policy
formulation by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith. I assume that all people receive utility
when their country helps those in misery elsewhere. This humanitarian preference, a
recipient’s poverty, and news coverage enter the utility function in an interactive way
consistent with the theoretical arguments from above: h(n, d)f(r), where n denotes
the amount of news coverage of B, d the level of misery in B, and r is the amount
of aid given to B. The function h(·) maps the news coverage and the recipient’s
poverty into people’s humanitarian attribution, and f(·) models the diminishing
humanitarian utility from increasing aid.5 For example, aid to a country results
5 The partial first derivatives of h(n, d) with respect to n and d as well as the cross-partial
derivaties are all (weakly) positive. Also: h(n = 0, d) = h(n, d = 0) = 0.
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in more utility for the winning coalition as news coverage and misery individually
increase.
These components make up the utility for the winning coalition of each leader.
The winning coalitions compare the total utility from keeping the leader to the utility
that a challenger could provide, which is denoted as Q. If Q is greater than the utility
from the incumbent leader’s policy choices, then the winning coalition will remove
the leader. This completes the specification of the utilities of the players. As in
Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a), the sequence of moves is as follows: First, AL
proposes an aid-for-policy deal (r, y) where r is the o↵ered amount of aid. Then BL
decides whether to accept it. If accepted, r is transferred and y is set to the proposed
value. If rejected, no resources are transferred and BL sets y at the bliss point. Last,
AL and BL face domestic reselection.
2.3.2 Equilibrium
I will provide here the intuition of the subgame perfect equilibrium and relegate
details to Section A of the online appendix. The interaction of the two leaders
involving foreign aid has three e↵ects for the utility of the donor’s winning coalition.
First, giving foreign aid tightens the donor’s budget so that the leader can provide
fewer goods to the winning coalition; that is, g and z decline. Second, if enough aid
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is given that BL agrees to change the policy, then utility marginally improves from
  A to 0. Third, aid induces utility from warm glow (h(n, d)f(r)). The changes in
utility for the recipient leader’s winning coalition from receiving aid are analogous
but without the experience of warm glow. Any incoming aid increases the budget
and thus the domestic goods provisions and, if an aid-for-policy deal occurs, then
the utility for the winning coalition falls by  B.
Working backwards, the recipient leader will accept any deal that does not ask
him to change policy as any aid is better than no aid. If the donor proposes a policy
change, then the recipient can use the boosted budget to provide more domestic
policies. He needs this to o↵set the disutility that the policy change causes. This
introduces a minimum price r which is the amount of aid that makes the recipient
leader indi↵erent between accepting and rejecting a proposal to change policy. This
minimum price is a function of the rate at which greater resources let BL increase
his domestic policies as well as the recipient winning coalition’s valuation has for the
policy.
The donor leader will pick the combination of r and y that maximizes his winning
coalition’s utility. For ease of interpretability, I will graph the winning coalition’s
utility for any (r, y) minus its utility from not engaging in foreign aid activities at
all, which I denote as  (r, y). The optimal choice for the leader depends on the
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minimum price for a policy concession (r), the increase in   from obtaining the
policy concession, how cheaply the donor can give up resources as foreign aid, and
how much warm glow aid generates for the donor’s winning coalition. Therefore,
depending on the parameters of a particular case, the optimal amount of aid can lie
in four di↵erent regions, namely at r = 0, in r < r, at r = r, or in r > r.
These cases of where r lies, and the causal mechanisms that they suggest, are
best demonstrated visually. In Figure 2.1, each panel depicts an example for the four
possible cases of where the optimal r lies. In each panel, the abscissa gives amounts
of aid and the ordinate shows  (r, y). The dashed line plots  (r, y = 0), that is
the winning coalition’s utility improvement over not giving any aid when the leader
o↵ers r but does not ask BL to change y. Similarly, the solid line depicts  (r, y = 1),
which assumes that the donor leader asks for the policy change. The dots indicate
the maximum  (r, y) that can be achieved. Let’s go through the cases one by one
as they give rise to the main predictions.
On the far left in Figure 2.1, there is the zero-aid case in which no aid is given
and BL will not change its policy. No matter what the proposed combination of aid
and policy is,  (r, y) is less than or equal to zero such that any amount of aid would
not increase the utility of the donor leader’s winning coalitions. This is the case in
which the purchase of a policy concession requires that the donor leader to reduce
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Figure 2.1 : Aid-for-Policy Deals and AL’s Utility. The abscissa depicts the
possible amounts of aid. The ordinate shows the di↵erence in the donor’s winning
coalition’s utility from proposed aid-for-policy deals over not giving any aid at all.
Formally, it is  (r, y)=V ⇤(RA r,WA)+h(n, d)f(r)  A(1 y) V ⇤(RA,WA)+ A.
The dashed line shows  (r, y = 0), the solid line  (r, y = 1). The thin vertical line
gives BL’s minimum price for a policy concession, r. The dots denote the highest
utility that leader can confer to his winning coalition in each panel. The following
parameter values were chosen for each panel. Zero Aid Case:  A = 0.2, h(n, d) = 0,
RA = 700, RB = 250, WA = 600, WB = 200, pA = pB = 20,  B = 1.5. Humanitarian
Case:  A = 0.2, h(n, d) = 0.56, RA = 700, RB = 250, WA = 600, WB = 200,
pA = 0.79, pB = 20,  B = 1.5. Bargaining Case:  A = 4, h(n, d) = 0.3, RA = 700,
RB = 250, WA = 600, WB = 200, pA = pB = 20,  B = 1.5. Selfish Humanitarian
Case:  A = 4, h(n, d) = 0.56, RA = 500, RB = 250, WA = 600, WB = 200, pA = 2,
pB = 20,  B = 0.22.
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domestic policies too much, and there is too little warm glow that can be generated.
Therefore AL prefers not to give any aid. (Equivalently, AL could propose a policy
change and o↵er less than r, which BL will subsequently reject.)
On the near left, the humanitarian case is shown. The donor leader does not buy
a policy concession from the recipient as it has either a low saliecy for his winning
coalition (low  A), is too expensive in terms of foregone domestic goods, or the
minimum price (r) is too high. The donor leader would not propose a policy change,
as for low amounts of aid it would be rejected and the leader provides zero utility
improvement for his winning coalition; for aid greater than or equal to than r, the
foregone domestic goods are too costly for the donor leader. Therefore, the donor
leader simply piggybacks on the moderate news coverage and the recipient’s misery
and provides some aid without seeking a policy change. Thereby, he still improves
his humanitarian image over not spending any aid at all. Therefore, the optimal
amount of aid is determined by the news coverage, the recipient’s state of poverty,
and of the costs for giving up resources as aid. Since gains in humanitarian image are
driving the aid allocation, the variables a↵ecting a bargained amount of aid do not
matter for the actually observed amount of aid. This corresponds to the situation
described by Lumsdaine and Van Belle.
On the near right, the donor’s costs to transfer resources from domestic goods
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to aid is cheaper or the saliency for the policy is higher than in the previous case.
Therefore in this bargaining case, the donor leader asks for a policy concession and
pays exactly its minimum price, r = r. This corresponds to a version of the game in
Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) as well as to Morgenthau’s view where aid acts
solely as a bribe. The actually transferred amount of aid is then a function of the
factors that determine the bargaining over the policy concession (ie. the  , W , and
R for each A and B). Since the two states are bargaining, the optimal aid allocation
is una↵ected by how much humanitarian benefit the donor leader can reap. That is,
the amount of aid is independent of both news coverage and the recipient’s misery.
On the far right, the selfish humanitarian case is like the humanitarian case
except that the misery and news coverage of the recipient are so large that they
push the optimal amount of aid beyond r. In this case, the leader can also ask for
a policy change and will get it and thereby boost his winning coalition’s utility by
 A. When the selfish humanitarian case characterizes aid, then none of the variables
that determine the minimum price of the policy concession matter for the actual
aid allocation. Instead, the amount of aid is determined by the recipient’s poverty
and the donor leader’s ability to spend resources on aid. These are the same as in
humanitarian case.
Even though the model is close to the one in Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a),
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it sheds light on many novel aspects of foreign aid. Most importantly, the four
cases that characterize actual aid allocations occur under identifiable conditions.
Therefore, I also obtain predictions about when bargaining and humanitarian motives
are the crucial determinants for the amount of aid and thereby when aid is selfish
and when it is selfless. My model predicts that the variables associated with the
two humanitarian cases are more likely to matter for the actually observed aid as
the news coverage and the recipient’s misery increase, and those from the bargaining
case as the donor’s saliency in the recipient’s policies increases. Specifically, I will
test the following:
• As news coverage, recipient’s misery, and the donor’s saliency each increase, a
recipient is more likely to receive any aid, ie. the zero-aid case is less likely to
apply.
• As news coverage and recipient’s misery each increases, the humanitarian and
the selfish humanitarian cases become more likely to characterize the actual
aid allocation.
• As the donor’s saliency increases, the bargaining case becomes more likely to
characterize the actual aid allocation.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
My empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I will test whether the donor’s
saliency, news coverage, and the misery variables make it more likely that a donor
gives any aid at all. This assesses whether the zero-aid case is distinguishable from
the bargaining and humanitarian cases. Second and most importantly, I will estimate
a statistical model that lets me study when states bargain over aid and when donor
leaders cater to their winning coalitions’ humanitarian interests. Last, I will test
whether my statistical models fit the data better than competitor models.
Unfortunately, as data on the policy concessions are unavailable, I will not be
able to distinguish between the the humanitarian and selfish humanitarian cases in
my statistical models. Their maximizing amount of aid is determined in the same
way by the news coverage, the recipient’s poverty, and the donor’s cost of giving
up resources for aid. Therefore, I have to collapse the humanitarian and selfish
humanitarian cases into one category for the empirical analysis which I call the
humanitarian case.
2.4.1 Statistical Models
I am running two di↵erent statistical tests, one to determine whether the zero-aid
or any of the other two applies and another to test under which circumstances bar-
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gaining or humanitarian incentives drive the actual aid allocation. The first test is
straightforward, using a simple probit to assess whether news coverage, recipient’s
misery, and the measures for the donor’s saliency for policy concessions increase the
probability of getting any aid. The second test is more di cult and merits discussion.
How can we model statistically when each of the theoretical cases applies to a
particular observation? The statistical approach not only needs to explains variation
in foreign aid by di↵erent sets of covariates, which I shall call “components,” but
also how covariates a↵ect the probability of each of the two covariate sets doing
the best job explaining aid. To this end, I use a finite mixture model in which the
applicability of the two components is modeled through data as well. This model is
known as a mixtures-of-experts.
Let’s develop the mixtures-of-experts model by starting with the likelihood of
the observed foreign aid. Let it be captured by the variable yit where i denotes
the donor-recipient pair and t the year of the observation. The humanitarian and
bargaining cases are modeled as a function of covariates and their coe cients, x(k)it
and  k for k 2 {h, b}, and common variables mit with coe cient vector  . I assume
that yit has one of two Gaussian densities (pN), which are the mixture components,
with parameters relating to the bargaining case (b) or to the humanitarian case




yit|mit  + x(k)it  k,  2k
⌘I(sit=k)
. This expression is the
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complete-data likelihood and requires knowledge of sit, which is a categorical variable
which indicates to which mixture component observation yit belongs. Obviously, this
variable unobservable. For now, suppose we knew sit, then we can easily model this
via, say, a Bernoulli-logistic model. Let this prior probability that an observation be-
longs to mixture component h be, Pr (sit = h) = 1 Pr (sit = b) = 11+exp( zit ) . Notice
that   tells us how variables a↵ect whether bargaining or humanitarian-motivated
aid become more likely and is therefore the main object of interest for the statistical
tests.6
How can can deal with the missing sit?. It is standard in the mixture literature
to recover it as part of the estimation by simply classifying each observation yit in
proportion to its relative marginal likelihood as either sit = h or sit = b (Fru¨hwirth-
Schnatter 2006). This turns out to be proportional to the kernel of a Bernoulli
density so that the probabilistic recovery of sit is trivial. I use an EM algorithm to
fit the model, relying on the flexmix implementation in R (Gru¨n & Leisch 2007). In
Section C of the online appendix, I carry out checks on identifiability of the model
as advocated by Gru¨n & Leisch (2012). My main conclusions are una↵ected by such
possible issues.
6 See Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2006) as an introduction to mixture modeling in general and Imai
& Tingley (2011) as a rare applications in political science.
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2.4.2 Data & Operationalizations
I construct both statistical models (probit, mixtures-of-experts) by tying them closely
to my theoretical model in terms of their structure and the included covariates. As a
consequence, the often-used rationale for control variables is at odds with this goal.
Variables that are not reconciled within the theoretical model should be left out. For
example, many studies on foreign aid allocations use a lagged dependent variable,
either for explicit theoretical reasons (e.g. Carey 2007) or to account for serial corre-
lation. My theoretical model assumes that aid is announced and negotiated in every
period anew so that last period’s aid allocation does not matter for this period’s;
hence I construct my statistical model assuming the same. Of course, that need not
be assumed theoretically but doing so gives a di↵erent theory that competes with
my model. As comparing models cannot be done by simply including the opposing
theory’s (or theories’) variables, we need to rely on comparative model testing statis-
tics (Clarke 2001, Clarke & Primo 2012). I o↵er a few such comparisons between my
model and models inspired by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith’s as well as by Lumsdaine
and Van Belle’s works. Obviously, more such comparisons are encouraged but are
beyond the scope of the present paper.
The donor saliency variable captures how much the donor’s winning coalition
cares about a policy concession from the recipient country. I rely on four commonly
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used measures. First, policies in former colonies play a significant role in donors’
domestic politics. For example, France cares that its culture and language are carried
on in former colonies, which it ensures by extending aid to recipient governments
(Schraeder 1995, Hook, Taylor & Schraeder 1998). Such aid may make politicians
more likely to push schools to teach French instead of English as a foreign language,
for example. The variable comes from the ICOW Project (Hensel 2006). Second,
interest in policies elsewhere tends to wane with distance (Schumpeter 1942). I
measure distance by (the logarithm of) the capital-to-capital distance (Gleditsch &
Ward 2001). Third, policy concessions from more populous countries should factor
more heavily as their e↵ects should be more momentous. Data comes from Penn
World Tables. Fourth, if the recipient enters the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), it can sell its vote to other states, a practice for which there is systematic
evidence (e.g. Kuziemko & Werker 2006). I use data by Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland
(2009).
News coverage plays a crucial role in the theoretical model. I collected original
data from the online archives of the print editions of a single major newspaper for each
donor country. Using the Toronto Star (Canada), Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (Germany),
Irish Times (Ireland), Corriere della Sera (Italy), El Pais (Spain), Neue Zu¨rcher
Zeitung (Switzerland), The Guardian (United Kingdom), and the New York Times
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(United States of America) each, I obtained counts for each newspaper of the number
of articles that mention each recipient. The variable is standardized by each donor to
account for heterogeneity due to general news volume, linguistic uniquenesses, and
the particular policies by newspapers. The variable News it is then the news volume
in year t in the donor country about the recipient which make up dyad i. Section D
in the online appendix has several validity checks for my data collection.
I capture the recipient’s misery with three variables. First, I use the gross do-
mestic product per capita of the country (Gleditsch 2002) as a broad measure of
general human welfare. Second, I measure the extent of disasters by the number of
people a↵ected by droughts, floods, volcanos, and earthquakes (CRED 2011). This
corresponds to opinion surveys that show that people in donor countries support
aid for disaster-struck countries. The third measure of misery is a dummy for Sub-
Saharan African countries. This is inspired again by how surveys frame the concept
of compassion with human su↵ering.
A few further variables need to be operationalized that are part of the theory,
but not of explicit hypotheses. Data on the sizes of the countries’ winning coalitions
is calculated from Norris (2008) using the definition in Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003b). The variables’ levels are dummied apart in the analysis. The governmental
resource data come from Heston, Summers & Aten (2011), and are the product of
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the country’s population, GDP-per-capita, and the government’s share of GDP.
These variables are used throughout my analysis. The variables for saliency, news,
and a recpient’s poverty enter the probit simply linearly and additively. However,
for the mixture-of-experts, the use of the variables requires more care as it needs to
comport with the setup of the theoretical model. First, the variables in x(h)it explain
the humanitarian case and feature an intercept, news coverage, all the variables
measuring the recipient’s poverty, and interactions between news and the poverty
variables. Second, an intercept, all saliency measures, and dummies for the recipient’s
size of the winning coalition enter x(b)it .
7 Third, in mit, I account for the unobserved
heterogeneity that is introduced in my theoretical model through the valence term,
✓. Foremost, I include a trend for all observations by using a third-order polynomial
of time. In some specifications, I include dummies for either each donor (with the
United States as the excluded category) or for each recipient region.
Last and most importantly, there are also variables that help explain when each of
the cases apply. This hierarchical part of the mixtures-of-experts is modeled through
variables in zit. The theoretical model suggests that donor saliency, news coverage,
and misery drive which condition best explains the actually observed amount of aid.
A summary of the use of variables is provided in Table 2.1.
7 The donor’s winning coalition size also matters, but there is no variation in it in my sample.
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x(h)it Intercept, news coverage (logged), total number of people a↵ected by disas-
ter (logged), recipient’s GDP-per-capita (logged), dummy for Sub-Saharan
Africa, and interactions between the news and all other variables.
x(b)it Intercept, colony dummy, geographic distance (logged), recipient’s popu-
lation (logged), dummy for UNSC membership, resource of the recipient
(logged), dummies for each level of the recipient’s winning coalition size
mit Polynomial of the third order of time, donor government resources (logged)
zit Intercept, colony dummy, recipient’s population (logged), dummy for UNSC
membership, geographic distance (logged), news coverage (logged), total
number of people a↵ected by disaster (logged), recipient’s GDP-per-capita
(logged), dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa
Table 2.1 : Overview of Covariates in the Mixture-of-Experts Model. In
some specifications, mit includes donor-specific or recipient-region fixed e↵ects.
Finally, aid for each of the donors in the data comes from the OECD Development
Assistance Committee. I use aid commitments from each donor to each recipient
in each year in constant dollars. The data set consists of eight donors (Canada,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) and
99 recipients, which are listed in Section B of the online appendix. This makes for
5,796 donor-recipient-years in total and 4,338 with positive amounts of aid. The




Having introduced data and models, I will first turn to my predictions about the
applicability of the zero-aid case vis-a`-vis the other cases. I then present the results
from the mixtures-of-experts model to understand if a recipient receives any aid, when
the actual amount is driven by bargaining between the donor and the recipient, and
when it is driven by the donors’ winning coalitions’s humanitarian preferences.
The theory suggests that greater recipient’s misery, news coverage, and donor’s
saliency for policy concessions increase the probability that a recipient receives any
aid at all and that the zero-aid case is less likely to apply. These predictions are
tested using a simple probit including the aformentioned operationalizations. Be-
cause of the non-linearity of the model and the interactions, I show the e↵ects by
calculating the first di↵erence of the probabilities when each variable changes by a
preset amount. Specifically, I raise the dummy variables from zero to one, decrease
the GDP/capita and distance from one standard deviation below the mean to one
standard deviation above it, and increase the news coverage and the number of people
a↵ected by disasters from a standard deviation below the means to one above. I draw
1,000 parameter values (King, Tomz & Wittenberg 2000), calculate the distribution
of first di↵erences of the probabilities averaged across the data, and summarize this
distribution by depicting the median and central 50% and 90% confidence intervals.
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The expectations are mostly found in the data as Figures 2.8 and 2.11 in the online
appendix demonstrate. Increases in news coverage, the recipient’s misery, and the
donor’s saliency over policy concessions substantively increase the probability that a
recipient receives any aid at all. Even though these empirical relationships are hardly
surprising as they have been reported before, they have a di↵erent interpretation
in the context of my theoretical model. They suggest that both, bargaining and
humanitarian incentives are more likely to factor in the aid allocation. Next, I will
turn to testing when each of these two cases becomes more likely vis-a`-vis the other
conditional on there being any aid at all.
The main analysis is about when each motive drives the actual allocation of
aid for cases for which the zero-aid case does not apply. For this reason, I drop
all observations that are equal to zero, take the logarithm, and run the mixtures-of-
experts models. There are three separate models to try to account for the unobserved
valences for the leaders: without either donor or recipient region dummies, with
only donor dummies, and with only recipient region dummies. Judging by the the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for each model, the model with donor dummies
performed best. The ensuing analysis is based on that model. The results based on
the other two models are substantively very similar and are available in the online
appendix in Figures 2.9 and 2.10.
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The main quantity of interest is how the prior probability that some observa-
tion yit belongs to either the bargaining or the humanitarian case responds to the
changes in news coverage, saliency and the humanitarian variables. As the probabil-
ity Pr(sit = k|·) is modeled through a logistic function, the magnitudes of changes
are di cult to discern. As above, I forego discussing the parameters altogether and
relegate them to Figure 2.13 in the online appendix. Instead, I will present the simu-
lated quantities of main interest in a series of graphs, which are calculated the same
way as for Figure 2.8.
Let’s first consider the e↵ect of the amount of news coverage which is expected
to increase the probability that the humanitarian case best explains the variation in
aid. The lower panel of Figure 2.2 shows the result. Increasing news coverage from a
standard deviation below its sample mean to one standard deviation above increases
the probability that an observation is best explained by the variables associated
with the humanitarian case. The median estimate of the magnitude of the increase
is 63 percentage points [47, 71]. The numbers in the brackets show the the 25th and
the 75th percentiles of the simulated e↵ects. This result suggests that greater news
coverage, ceteris paribus, makes it more likely that the donor and and the recipient
are not bargaining over a policy concession, but that the donor leader caters to his























Changes in Humanitarian Case Probability
Figure 2.2 : Data-averaged First Di↵erence for the Probability of Bargain-
ing and Humanitarian Cases Apply. The upper panel shows the e↵ects on
the probabilty that bargaining best explains aid, the lower panel does the same for
the humanitarian case. The gray and black lines give the 50% and 90% confidence
intervals, respectively. The dots denote the median.
The estimate of the e↵ects of the disasters is mostly in the predicted direction
as well, but small in magnitude. The e↵ect is an increase by three [0, 9] percentage
points with a total of 74% of all simulated first di↵erences greater than zero. Last, the
e↵ects for the Sub-Saharan African recipients and those with a smaller GDP/capita
are opposite to my expectations. The humanitarian case changes its applicability by
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-38 [-45, -27] and -16 [-26, -7] percentage points for Sub-Saharan African recipients
and when GDP/capita declines from a standard deviation below the mean to one
stardard deviation above, respectively.
Turning to how the saliency of political concessions for donor a↵ects whether
bargaining best describes the observed amount of foreign aid, the upper panel in
Figure 2.2 displays first di↵erences calculated the same way as before. Evidence in
support of my predictions is better with respect to the donor saliency variables. There
are sizeable e↵ects in the predicted direction for former colonies and when increasing
the population of the recipient from the mean by one standard deviation. Colonial
status makes it 51 [30, 66] percentage points more likely that bargaining occurs
between the donor and the recipient. The increase in the recipient’s population
increases the same probability by 41 [22, 55] percentage points. Being on the UNSC
makes a recipient only marginally more likely to be bargained with; the median
e↵ect is a two percentage point increase [0, 7] with 76% of all simulation draws
falling on the positive side. However, this e↵ect is slightly sensitive to the exact
model specification. Whereas the median e↵ect rounds either to zero or slightly
positive, the 25th percentile of the e↵ect may round to a decline of one percentage
point. The lowest estimate of the fraction of simulations that are positive is 62%
(see Figures 2.9 and 2.10.). In contrast, a decrease in distance makes bargaining less
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likely by 51 percentage points [-63, -35].
The evidence is largely supportive of the theory’s predictions. First, all of the
simulated changes in the variables make it more likely that the amount of aid follows
either the bargaining or humanitarian case. Second, more extensive disasters and
more news coverage make the donor leader more likely to provide aid because of
incentives to appear humanitarian vis-a`-vis his winning coalition. Third and last,
donor leaders are more likely to bargain over policy concessions when the recipient
is more populous, a former colony, and (slightly) when it is a member of the UNSC.
If my arguments are pertinent for explaining foreign aid, then a statistical model
reflecting them should fit the data better than others. Specifically, I compare the
three specifications of the mixtures-of-experts model to statistical models that are
inspired by the work of Bueno de Mesquita & Smith as well as by Lumsdaine and
Van Belle. As I am using di↵erent sets of donors and recipients as well as somewhat
di↵erent data sources than these authors do in their articles, comparing the mixtures-
of-experts models to their models would lead to a comparison of the model structures,
data sources, and operationalizations. That would render opaque the di↵erence that
the model structure makes. Therefore, I use model specifications that are consistent
with their theoretical work, but rely on the data sources and operationalizations
introduced above. In addition, I also estimate a “garbage can” model, which enjoys
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prominence in the literature.
For the Bueno de Mesquita & Smith Model, I include the donor’s and the re-
cipient’s resources, the recipient’s winning coalition size, and my four measures of
policy concession saliency. I capture the thrust of the arguments by Lumsdaine and
Van Belle by including my measures of the recipient’s misery, news coverage, and
their interactions as well as the donor’s resources. Models also include a third-order
polynomial of time. The “garbage can” model includes the union of all variables.
Analogously to above, each model is estimated three times: without any fixed e↵ects,
with donor-specific dummies, and with recipient region-specific dummies.
The models are compared using the BIC. This criterion is an important yardstick
for the mixtures-of-experts as they penalize models with large number of parame-
ters as several variables appear twice in the models’ hierarchical components. If this
added complexity is unwarranted given the data, then the penalties would disadvan-
tage the mixtures-of-expert model.
Figure 2.3 shows that the mixtures-of-experts models perform the best against
almost all other models; only the “garbage can” model with donor fixed e↵ects
competes with the mixtures. However, the atheoretical nature of this “garbage can”
model leaves unclear which theoretical arguments it speaks to. These rankings show
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Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria
Figure 2.3 : Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria for each Model. Gray
dots denote the AIC, black dots the BIC. The models are sorted along the ordinate by
their BIC. Lower values for either are preferred. The competitor models’ coe cient
estimates can be seen in Figure 2.15 in Section F of the online appendix.
themsleves that matters for the improved fit of the mixtures-of-experts model. We
can therefore conclude that my theoretical model provides important insights into
the logic of aid flows; this improvement comes from allowing for selfish and selfless
motives to matter in a strategic foreign aid process.
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2.5 Conclusion
These findings o↵er a reconciliation of decades of scholarship which struggled to show
whether aid was given for selfless or selfish reasons. This paper shows that the reason
there is evidence for either view on average is that each logic applies to only a subset
of all cases. Some cases are selfish when states bargain, some are selfless when the
donor leader has incentives to heed humanitarian calls, and on average they look a
bit like both. Others have suggested before that both motives are at play (e.g. van
der Veen 2011), however this paper o↵ers the additional crucial insight that these
logics may be at play for any donor, any recipient, and at any time under identifiable
cases. That is, a donor can act selfishly toward some recipients, but selflessly vis-a`-
vis others at the same time. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly for future
research, my model provides insights into when either applies.
Scholars of foreign aid have long been able to predict the amounts of aid rea-
sonably well. However, statistically accounting for variation in this dependent vari-
able is insu cient for understanding how foreign aid works. Such a task requires
deeper theorizing about the politics behind aid. In particular, recent e↵orts have
used sophisticated theories of political economy to model foreign aid (e.g. Bueno de
Mesquita & Smith 2009a, Milner & Tingley 2010). However with greater theoretical
complexity comes an increased burden on statistical models as omitting the structure
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implied by the theoretical model is prone to lead to fallacious conclusions (Signorino
& Yilmaz 2003, Arena & Joyce 2011). I account for the theory’s structure using the
mixtures-of-experts model, which o↵er novel, substantively important insights into
the workings of foreign aid.
One example should highlight the gains. My model reveals how common wisdom
may lead practitioners astray. For instance, development activists have been working
to raise awareness about poverty with the goal that donors increase development aid
to 0.7% of the donor’s GDP (see Clemens & Moss 2007). My results show that such
greater attention does lead to more foreign aid, but at the same time it becomes more
likely that the donor leader demands policy concessions from the recipient as well.
This happens when the increased attention causes a move from the humanitarian or
zero-aid cases to the selfish humanitarian case in Figure 2.1. If more awareness leads
to a greater pursuit of policy concessions by the donor, then recent work suggests
that aid will not bring about favorable results for the recipient’s population (e.g.
Bearce & Tirone 2010, Girod 2012). It is still the case that greater awareness of
development issues leads to more aid, but donor leaders will design the foreign aid
package to fit their survival imperatives. In the example here, this means adding the
demand for a policy concession which may bring about outcomes that are contrary
to what was ostensibly sought.
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This implication of my model speaks to the broader issue of principal-agent re-
lationships when the principals lack expertise to judge what the agent is doing.
Even though democracies may generally be more transparent (Hollyer, Rosendor↵ &
Vreeland 2012) so that citizens can better monitor their government, citizens often
lack the expertise to judge complicated details, such as the amount of aid or whether
a policy concession took place. This in turn creates an incentive for the government
to comply with citizens’ wishes in a way that is visible and easily comprehensible
when it is beneficial (Majumdar, Mani & Mukand 2004, Mani & Mukand 2007).
However, this asymmetry in expertise creates clandestine incentives. In this vein,
Kono (2006) shows democratic governments tailor facets of the policy so that it may
undermine its ostensible compliance with citizens’ wishes. This is in Kono’s case
that governments errect hard-to-assess non-tari↵ barriers to balance out lower nom-
inal tari↵s, whereas governments in my case may seek additional policy concessions.
In either case, the government is not punished as citizens lack the expertise to judge
all details of the policy.
This in turn touches upon the rational design of institutions literature which
gained prominence in the international relations literature (e.g. Koremenos, Lipson &
Snidal 2001); donor leaders tailor the details of an aid package in terms of its amount
and whether a policy concession is demanded. This inevitably raises the question of
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what determines the rational design of many other features of foreign aid that are
commonly studied to matter for aid e↵ectiveness, such as the channels of delivery
or the degree to which aid is tied. Since these design elements can have profound
consequences on the e↵ectiveness of aid, scholars should extend upon the small but
growing number of articles that have also studied the design of aid (Fariss 2010,
Winters 2010, Winters & Martinez 2012, Dietrich 2012). It should be particularly
fruitful to consider these design aspects as arising from di↵erent motives that can
bring about foreign aid. In this vein, Chapter 3 of this dissertation builds upon this
paper and shows how the donor government can exploit its winning coalition’s lack
of expertise and reneges on the promises of foreign aid in the humanitarian case;
interestingly, this largely does not occur in the bargaining case. Greater insight into
the domestic bases of the design of foreign aid should greatly improve scholars’ and




The intuition behind the equilibrium is similar to that in Bueno de Mesquita &
Smith (2009a) which I stated in the body of the text. However, the details of solving
the game are a bit di↵erent. First, whereas Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a)
derived a function for the extent of the policy concessions for a given amount of
aid, I modeled policy concessions in a discrete manner. Thereby a minimum price
for the policy concessions follows. Second, the optimal choice for the extent of the
policy concessions is calculated by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) with the
aid allocation following from the correspondence between concessions and foreign
aid. In contrast, I let the donor leader AL choose a bundle of aid and which policy
concession to ask for.
Let’s first derive V ⇤(R,W ), which is the maximal utility from public and private
goods that the leader can provide for a given amount of available resources and a
given size of the winning coalition. Leaving out everything associated with foreign aid
and the policy deal, the survival condition for either leader is Q < ✓+u(z)+v(g). As
✓ is unobserved but has a known cumulative density function F (x), the probability
of survival is 1   F (Q   v(g)   u(z)). As the leader only cares about survival, he
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wants to minimize F (Q   v(g)   u(z)) which he does by maximizing u(z) + v(g).
Both g and z have a price and cannot exceed the budget constraint in cost. That
is, pg + Wz  R. Let g⇤(R,W ) and z⇤(R,W ) be the values that maximize the
sum u(z) + v(g) under the budget constraint. It is obvious that di↵erent sizes of
the winning coalitions and budgets yield di↵erent maxima. It useful to define the
function V ⇤(R,W )=u(z⇤(R,W ))+v(g⇤(R,W )). V ⇤(R,W ) gives the maximal utility
from public and private goods that the leader can supply to the winning coalition of
a given size under a given budget constraint. The comparative statics of V ⇤(R,W )
are @V ⇤/@R > 0 and @V ⇤/@W < 0.
There are two cases to consider. First, if the donor proposes some aid-for-policy
deal with a positive amount of aid, but does not ask for a change in policy (ie.
(r > 0, y = 0)), BL will always accept it. If the recipient leader can stick to his
preferred policy of y = 0, then any positive amount of aid is desired. Second, if AL
proposes a deal that involves a change in policy (ie. (r > 0, y = 1)), then BL will
only accept the deal if his survival prospects stay the same or are improved. That
is, there is a minimum price that needs to be met in order for BL to agree to such a
deal which incurs disutility of  B to his winning coalition. This minimum price r is
the solution for r in V ⇤(RB + r,WB)   B = V ⇤(RB,WB). Defining for each country
i 2 {A,B}, Di = 1/
p
p2/Wi + p +
p






The donor leader faces a similar survival problem, but he gets to move first and
propose the aid-for-policy deal. He knows that any deal not asking for a policy
change but o↵ering a positive amount of aid will be accepted, and any demanding a
policy change will only be accepted if aid is greater than r. The leader’s objective
function  ˜ is the di↵erence in utility for the donor leader’s winning coalition that
an aid-for-policy (r, y) deal can provide:
 ˜(r, y) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
V ⇤(RA   r,WA) + h(n, d)f(r)   A if r < r & y = 0;
V ⇤(RA,WA)   A if r < r & y = 1;
V ⇤(RA   r,WA) + h(n, d)f(r)   A if r   r & y = 0;
V ⇤(RA   r,WA) + h(n, d)f(r) if r   r & y = 1.
The donor leader will pick (r, y) = argmaxr 0,y2{0,1}  ˜(r, y). Whereas the eas-
iest way to find this optimal choice is to consider Figure 2.1, which actually gives
 (r, y) =  ˜(r, y)  V ⇤(RA,WA) +  A for an easier depiction, Proposition 1 gives the
technical result.
The equilibrium aid-for-policy deals and thus the allocated aid can be stated
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more formally as in Proposition 1.







. V ⇤(R,W ) defines the maxi-
mum utility from optimal provisions of public and private goods that a leader can
provide to a winning coalition of size W with a budget R. In the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game, AL o↵ers:
(r⇤, y⇤) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(0, 0) if V ⇤(RA,WA) > V ⇤(RA   r˜,WA) + h(n, d)f(r˜);
(r˜, 0) if V ⇤(RA,WA)  V ⇤(RA   r˜,WA) + h(n, d)f(r˜) and
V ⇤(RA   r˜,WA)   A + h(n, d)f(r˜) > V ⇤(RA   r,WA) + h(n, d)f(r);
(r, 1) if V ⇤(RA   r˜,WA)   A + h(n, d)f(r˜)  V ⇤(RA   r,WA) + h(n, d)f(r);
(r˜, 1) if r˜ > r,
which is subsequently accepted by BL.
2.6.2 List of Recipient Countries
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Caribbean & Non-Iberian America Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago
Central & Eastern Europe Armenia, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Latin America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela
Sub-Saharan Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Soma-
lia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Angola, Botswana,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Middle East & North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mo-
rocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates
East Asia North Korea, Mongolia
South Asia Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka
Southeast Asia Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philip-
pines, Thailand
Pacific Islands Fiji, Papua New Guinea
Table 2.2 : List of Recipient Countries and Regions.
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2.6.3 Identification Check
John Geweke argues identifiability of parameters in statistical models per se´ is not a
problem if your quantity of interest is una↵ected by it.8 To this end, I check problems
of identifiability of my mixture models with respect to the central quantity of interest
of this paper, namely Figure 2.2 in particular as well as in Figures 2.9 and 2.10.
General identifiability of finite mixture and of mixtures-of-experts models is dis-
cussed by Hennig as well as by Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter.9 The conditions are di cult
to verify but, as Imai and Tingley point out in footnote 27, statisticians’ use of
mixture-of-experts models place considerably greater demands on the identifiability
and correlations in the data than the applications by Imai and Tingley and in this
paper.10 Unlike these applications, statisticians routinely use the same variables for
each covariate set (ie. x(h)it , x
(b)
it , mit, and zit in this paper’s notation).
Gru¨n & Leisch (2012), the authors of the flexmix package, which is used in this
paper to estimate the mixture-of-experts models, propose a simple resampling pro-
cedure to check for identifiability issues. To this end, I bootstrap my data, estimate
8 John Geweke, “Interpretation and inference in mixture models: Simple MCMC works,” Com-
putational Statistics & Data Analysis, Volume 51, Issue 7, 2007, pg. 3529-3550.
9 See Christian Hennig, “Identifiablity of Models for Clusterwise Linear Regression,” Journal of
Classification, Volume 17, Number 2, 2000, pg. 273–296; Sylvia Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, Finite
Mixture and Markov Switching Models, Springer Verlag, 2006.
10 Kosuke Imai and Dustin Tingley, “A Statistical Method for Empirical Testing of Competing
Theories,” American Journal of Political Science, Volume 56, Number 1, 2012, pg. 218–236.
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the three mixtures-of-experts specifications discussed in the paper, simulate several
draws (100) of the quantities depicted in the figures mentioned before, and save
them. Notice that, unlike in the usual applications of bootstrapping, the goal is not
to characterize the full bootstrap distribution, but to detect problems of identifiabil-
ity and instability. Therefore, this computationally-intensive procedure is repeated
only 1, 000 times. (On a dual-core, Intel i5 with 16GB RAM, making use of hyper-
threading, the procedure took around 60 hours.)
Each of the figures below shows the bootstrapped replication of Figures 2.2,
2.9, and 2.10. The figures below show that the substantive conclusions from the
full sample models that are discssued in the main text of the paper are stable with
perhaps the exception of the e↵ect of the UNSC dummy on the bargaining probability,
which appears cluster more around zero. As a whole, almost all of my results show
no signs of identifiability problems. Therefore, my central claims in the paper stand.
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Figure 2.4 : Check for Identification for Donor FE Model. This figure is a
bootstrapped replication of Figure 2.2. The upper row of panels gives the boot-
strapped e↵ects of the bargaining variables, the lower of the humanitarian variables.
Each panel is based on 1,000 bootstrap samples and estimations, saving 100 simu-
lated e↵ects for each. Each simulation was calculated the same way as explained in
the paper.
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Figure 2.5 : Check for Identification for Basic Model. This figure is a boot-
strapped replication of Figure 2.9. See caption for Figure 2.4 for details.
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Figure 2.6 : Check for Identification for Recipient Region FE Model. This
figure is a bootstrapped replication of Figure 2.10. See caption for Figure 2.4 for
details.
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2.6.4 Validity Check for News Variable
I collected the data on news coverage of each recipient in each donor country in
each year by searching the online archives for one major newspaper. These are
Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung for Germany, Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung for Switzerland, the New
York Times for the United States of America, Irish Times for Ireland, Corriere della
Sera for Italy, El Pais for Spain, The Guardian for the United Kingdom, and the
Toronto Star for Canada.
The validity of this data collection is checked by examining whether the news
variable follows predictable patterns. First, one would expect that news coverage is
generally highly autoregressive. Theoretical work on the economic logic of newspa-
pers focus on costs and benefits of covering particular countries.11 Focusing on costs
for now, the presence of sta↵ in particular areas and the sta↵’s specialization is a
considerable investment by the news organization. These are, in the short-run, sunk
costs so that the reporting costs would imply an autoregressive structure. Turning
to the benefits, the general relative interest of readers about other countries should
be stable as preferences are unlikely to change rapidly. Exceptions are of course
particular events, such as disasters, but these are aberrations from the regular news.
11 See for example, David Stro¨mberg, “Mass Media and Public Policy,” European Economic
Review, Volume 45, Number 4–6, 2001, pg. 652–663.
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Second, the aforementioned disasters should correlate with news coverage. This re-
lationship has been shown repeatedly.12 Third, two variables can be used to capture
the benefits to newspaper covering a country by considering about which countries
the readership cares. I measure this by relying on geographic distance, which has of-
ten been shown to correlate with news coverage,13 and a dummy indicating whether
the country is a former colony. The justification for both follows the arguments laid
out in the Data & Operationalization section of the paper.
I perform the validity check by running a total of five regressions. In the “Au-
toregressive” model, I regress the news variable on its lag. For the “Simple” model,
I include only the (logarithm of the) geographic distance in kilometers, the former
colony dummy, and the number of people a↵ected by natural disasters. The “Rec.
Region FE” and “Donor FE” models include recipient region fixed and donor fixed
e↵ects, respectively. Last, the “Full FE” model includes fixed e↵ects for donors,
recipient regions, and years. All data sources and transformations are as described
in the main text of the paper.
12 For example, see Douglas A. Van Belle, “Race and U.S. Foreign Disaster Aid,” International
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Volume 17, Number 3, 1999, pg. 339–365; Thomas
Eisensee and David Stro¨mberg, “News Droughts, News Floods, and U.S. Disaster Relief,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 122, Issue 2, 2007, pg. 693–728.
13 See for example, Tsan-Kuo Chang, Pamela J. Shoemaker, and Nancy Brendliner, “Determi-
nants of International News Coverage in the U.S. Media,” Communication Research, Volume
14, Number 4, 1987, pg. 396–414; Haoming Denis Wu, “Geographic Distance and Us News-
paper Coverage of Canada and Mexico,” International Communication Gazette, Volume 60,
Number 3, 1998, pg. 253–263
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Validity Check for News Variable
Figure 2.7 : Check for Validity of News Variable. The variables (including the
dependent variable) are all mean-centered and divided by one standard deviation.
The dot shows the coe cient estimate whereas the thin, black horizontal line centered
on the dots gives the range of the coe cient plus/ minus two standard deviations.
For several variables, this range is very short so that it is covered due to the size of
the coe cient. The coe cients for fixed e↵ects and intercepts are supressed. These
are available from the author or can be easily calculated from the replication package.
Figure 2.7 gives the four variables’ coe cients (plus/ minus two standard errors)
for the five separate models. For legibility reasons, I omit showing any fixed e↵ects.
The expected patterns are found for the news variable. First, news coverage is highly
autoregressive (with a coe cient of roughly .9). Second, an increase in geographic
distance reduces news coverage whereas being a former colony and being a↵ected by
disasters increases coverage.
These patterns suggest that my news data collection captures the attention paid
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by a donor country to a recipient country in a particular year. It is important to
note that, even though these variables systematically a↵ect the news volume, there
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Figure 2.8 : Data-averaged First Di↵erence for the Probability of Getting
Any Aid. The gray and black lines give the 50% and 90% confidence intervals,
respectively. The dots denote the median. See Figure 2.11 for the model’s coe cients.
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Figure 2.9 : E↵ects on the Case Probabilities. Estimates for the Mixture-of-
Experts Models without Fixed E↵ects. See caption to Figure 2.2 for details.
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Figure 2.10 : E↵ects on the Case Probabilities. Estimates for the Mixture-of-































Coefficients for Binary Model
Figure 2.11 : Coe cient Estimates for the Getting-Any-Aid Model. See
caption for Figure 2.12 for details. See Figure 2.8 for simulated substantive e↵ects.
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Mixture Model without Fixed E↵ects
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Coefficients for ME, Basic Model
Figure 2.12 : Coe cient Estimates for the Mixture-of-Experts Models with-
out Any Fixed E↵ects. The columns refer, from left to right, to the coe cients
on the variables in x(h)it , x
(b)
it , and zit. The coe cients for mit appear in the first and
second columns as these variables’ e↵ects are constant and apply to both cases. The
dot shows the coe cient estimate whereas the black horizontal line centered on the
dots give the range of the coe cient plus/ minus two standard deviations.
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Mixture Model with Donor Fixed E↵ects
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Figure 2.13 : Coe cient Estimates for the Mixture-of-Experts Models with
Donor-Specific Fixed E↵ects. See caption for Figure 2.12 for details.
71
Mixture Model with Recipient Region Fixed E↵ects
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Figure 2.14 : Coe cient Estimates for the Mixture-of-Experts Models with



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.15 : Coe cient Estimates for the Competitor Models. See caption
for Figure 2.12 for details.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Reneging on Foreign Aid Promises
3.1 Introduction
The United States government pledged in 2009 to provide Pakistan $7.5bn in foreign
aid over five years but provided only 5% of the amount by mid-2011.1,2 Similarly,
major donor countries of foreign aid failed to honor their promise from 2005 of
doubling development assistance by 2010, increasing aid by roughly 40% instead.3
Further, activists accused the United States’ government in 2010 for failing to live
up to its pledges to fund the Global Health Initiative.4 These examples are hardly
aberrations. One of the few studies on the discrepancy between aid commitments
and disbursements reports that OECD donors on average and over decades promised
1 I would like to thank Mark Buntaine, Simone Dietrich, Yoshi Kobayashi, Amanda Licht, Carla
Martinez Machain, Cli↵ Morgan, Randy Stevenson, Maurits van der Veen, Rob Walker, and
Matt Winters for fruitful discussions and suggestions. Previous versions were presented at the
University of South Carolina, The University of Texas at Dallas, the Universita¨t Regensburg,
2012 APSA Annual Conference, 2012 European Political Science Association Conference, Rob
Walkers research seminar, 2012 International Studies Association Conference, 2012 MPSA
Annual Conference, and at Rice University’s IR Lunch.
2 See Washington Post, “Aid plan for Pakistan is falling short of promise,” August 5, 2011.
3 See The Guardian, “Western countries fail to meet Gleneagles aid pledges,” April 6, 2011.
4 See Washington Post, “Rage, panic in AIDS fight,” July 29, 2010.
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roughly a third more than they eventually provided (Bul´ıˇr & Hamann 2008).
Development activists often assign blame for this shortfall to the donor govern-
ments. They label them as a “scandal,” “cynical,” a “poor record” and “fancy
accounting” by donors.5 When surveyed about the reasons for these shortfalls, the
donor governments point their fingers toward their own and the recipients’ bureau-
cracies as well as at recipients’ failure to live up to donors’ conditions (Strategic
Partnership with Africa 2008, Section 2). As unfortunate as such shortfalls may
be from the perspective of the recipient governments, aside from a small number of
largely empirical studies, little knowledge exists about the phenomenon. In particu-
lar no theoretical framework exists that is comparable in its scope and detail to what
exists in the rich literature on aid allocation.
Why does aid shortfall matter? Research by Lensink & Morrissey (2000) suggests
that the risk of aid shortfall is associated with negative macroeconomic outcomes for
the recipient country. This might serve as a (partial) explanation for why foreign aid
is at best only mildly associated with economic growth (e.g. Burnside & Dollar 2000,
Hansen & Tarp 2001, Easterly 2003, Dalgaard, Hansen & Tarp 2004). The argument
is that, by insistence of donors, recipient governments use aid promises to plan their
5 See, in order, Bob Geldorf in The Sunday Herald, “The summer of 8,” June 10, 2007; Oxfam
in BBC News, “Aid ‘shortfall’ to poorer nations,” February 17, 2010; ONE’s Adrian Lovett in
Reuters, “EU missing overseas aid goals as austerity bites,” June 25, 2012; and Oxfam Japan
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investments. If promised tranches of aid go undelivered, then the recipient may
face financial liquidity constraints which could make recipients abandon unfinished
projects. As a result, the amount of aid already spent on projects would be lost
without returns on the investment (Leurs 2005, Celasun & Walliser 2008, Desai &
Kharas 2010).6 Concerns over the seemingly dire consequences of underdelivery
spurred the major donors to vow to improve the predictability of their funds. The
promise was made in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid E↵ectiveness, yet little
improvement has taken place since then (OECD 2005,2011).
This paper provides, to my knowledge, the first theoretical model that accounts
for aid commitments and disbursement at the same time. The model explicitly fo-
cuses on the costs and benefits that occur when aid is committed and when it is dis-
bursed. Following the basic insights from recent political economy models of foreign
aid, the donor government transfers resources called foreign aid to the recipient in
order to secure some policy concessions from the recipient (Morgenthau 1962, Bueno
de Mesquita & Smith 2009a). However, there are also benefits for the government if
aid is given and is perceived as humanitarian. This might be the case of if the recip-
ient is struck by a disaster or is plagued by diseases (Rioux & Van Belle 2005, van
6 This is linked to but is distinct from “aid volatility.” “Volatility” refers to year-to-year fluc-
tuations of aid disbursement. “Predictability,” ”shortfall,” “underdelivery,” “reneging,” and
“overpromise” refer strictly to the relation between commitments and disbursements of foreign
aid, which is exclusively the issue of interest in this paper.
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der Veen 2011, Heinrich 2013). Crucially, the news media needs to provide cover-
age of that recipient so that people become aware of these aid flows (Eisensee &
Stro¨mberg 2007); otherwise, people could not and would not credit the leader as
having acted in a huminitarian fashion. Policy concessions are appreciated by peo-
ple in the donor country as they may provide tangible benefits (perhaps cheaper oil,
military basing rights); people also value when their government helps the destitute
of the world as surveys have shown for decades (Riddell 2007, Ch. 7).
The insight of this paper is that the two di↵erent reasons for foreign aid sharply
condition the leader’s incentives to renege on the commitments. As aid increasingly
serves to buy policy concessions, then the incentives to renege wane. After all, the
aid commitment served as a truthful signal of what was intended to be obtained,
which the leader could provide to his domestic support group. In contrast, aid that
is driven more by people’s humanitarian preferences requires that news coverage
makes citizens aware. Commitments are made when news coverage is high, such as
in the case of natural disasters, but disbursement decisions are made when attention
has faded. More generally, when there is news coverage of foreign aid, newspapers
tend to focus on announcements and disbursement while almost never mentioning
that the donor had not lived up to promises. Therefore, leaders can shirk more on
disbursements without citizens generally realizing it. The saved money can go to
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domestic policies that people also care about (such as schools, police, etc.). In this
situation, the leader appears as more humanitarian without sacrificing the money
needed to actually be humanitarian.
The statistical results are broadly supportive of my predictions. When news
coverage in the donor country about the recipient as well as the humanitarian misery
(as measured by the number of people a↵ected by disasters) jointly increase, the
amount of reneged upon foreign aid increases on average by five to 12 million U.S
dollars. In the absence of a news increase, there is no increase in reneging as the
recipient’s misery increases. In contrast, as incentives to bargain with the recipient
increase (as measured by geographic distance and colonial status), the predicted
changes in reneging cluster around zero.
This chapter also proposes a novel research design that addresses a major data
issue. The annual data on aid commitments and disbursements as recorded by the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are not directly comparable as
it records aid commitments as made in a year and not the commitments made for a
year. We also lack knowledge about when funds announced in a year are slated to
be spent. Previous work either ignores the issue, relies on imperfect surrogate data,
or introduces further assumptions which invite bias of unknown size and direction.
I address the issue by introducing a statistical approach that allows me to produce
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simulated values of disbursements and commitments which are indeed comparable
and let me test my predictions.
In the next, section I will survey the sparse previous work on the aid shortfall and
also demonstrate that the issue has little room within existing theories of foreign aid
allocations. Then I will develop a political economy model of foreign aid as a foreign
policy choice. The logic of the model lets me derive predictions about foreign aid
commitments and disbursements which together let me make predictions about the
shortfall. In the empirical section, statistical results show that my predictions are
largely supported.
3.2 Aid Shortfall as Disbursement Delay
If aid is already committed and is thereby “backed by the necessary funds” from the
donor, why would the “transactions of providing financial resources” at the recip-
ient’s disposal not take place?7 The scant scholarly work views this divergence as
an issue of “disbursement delay;” that is, it studies only the process of disbursing
previously committed funds. The main tenants of this view are managerial problems
and political interventions.
First, scholars argue that disbursement delay occurs because of managerial prob-
7 Quotes are from the OECD DAC Glossary on “commitments” and “disbursement”, http:
//www.oecd.org/dac/glossary/.
79
lems. These include that recipient agencies have to obtain numerous authorizations
before spending a tranche of foreign aid. Other issues are that donor and recipient ac-
counting systems are incompatible. From this perspective, it is assumed that donors
want to spend aid but problems occur in the process of its delivery. The OECD rec-
ognized this perspective as an area in which the e ciency of could be improved by
simply streamlining procedures between donor and recipient countries. Such prob-
lems are at the heart of the 2005 Paris Declaration with which DAC members agreed
to make aid more predictable, reduce manangerial impediments to disbursement, and
coordinate better amongst each other (OECD 2005).
Second, scholars on disbursement delay also provide some suggestions for how
political interventions by the donors may retard the release of committed funds.
Odedokun (2003) argues that, even though aid commitments are firm obligations for
donors to eventually spend resources, donors often include conditions that, if not
met, allow donors to renege on their promises. This is easy, he argues, as there is no
independent arbiter of whether conditions were actually unmet or the donor simply
wanted to renege. Further, the details of what these conditions are and what the
recipient did or failed to do are often shrouded in secrecy. With the exceptions of
Britain and the Netherlands among statal donors recently, donors publish neither
the conditions, nor which conditions were violated when aid is suspended (OECD
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2011, Chapter 5). The disbursement delay scholars o↵er several further situations in
which one might expect reneging. For example, Diarra (2011) argues that donors are
hesitant to disburse in election years, hedging against uncertainty about the eventual
winner. Odedokun (2003) provides two further hypotheses by which peer pressure
may make G7 members more likely to fulfill promises and that donors’ fiscal deficits
may make reneging more attractive.8
Unfortunately, the aforementioned work is unsatisfactory on two levels. First, if
it is the assumption that donors’ commitments reflect a sincere intention to deliver
the resources, but delivery is hindered by managerial problems, then donors should
be expected to work to remedy the impediments. In 2005, major donors pledged to
remove these frictions but have actually done very little (OECD 2011). That suggests
that donors may say they want to improve the disbursement of aid but fail to do so.
This should compel scholars to reconsider the assumption that donors are sincere
about reducing aid shortfall. Second, scholars’ ideas about political interventions
do not amount to a theoretical understanding for why there is a di↵erence between
disbursements and commitments. In particular, no attempt is made to generate
insights as to why donors would care about recipients in the very first place, why
they would gain from reneging, why they promise but fail to improve predictability,
8 See also Leurs (2005).
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and why the recipient would not stick to what are the conditions of aid. Further, it
is unclear why disbursement should be judged against seemingly exogenous pledges.
Alternatively, we could try to explain why too much aid was promised in the very
first place and not why committed aid was not delivered. In short, this body of work
is lacking a theoretical basis for aid commitments and disbursement from which
insights about their divergence can come.
The lack of theoretical underpinnings is in stark contrast to the recent literature
on foreign aid allocations, where the sources for the motivations behind foreign aid
is a supreme topic (Lumsdaine 1993, Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009a, van der
Veen 2011, Heinrich 2013). This focus seems warranted as several recent studies on
the consequences of foreign aid highlight the importance of the motivations behind
aid for its e↵ectiveness (Bearce & Tirone 2010, Girod 2012). However, the main ten-
ants of this work, if engaged to speak about aid shortfall, would predict that there
should never be a di↵erence. In the political economy theories of foreign aid, the
promised amount is also optimal to be the paid amount. If aid is a price to be paid
for some policy concession (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2007, 2009) or is a means
for legislators to provide rents to their supporters (Fleck & Kilby 2001, Milner &
Tingley 2010, Powers, Leblang & Tierney 2010), then decision-makers should never
want to pay less than what was bargained for. Similarly, in such theories, announcing
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more aid than optimal for concessions or redistribution provides no benefits by these
scholars’ modeling assumptions. In work that is anchored in the assumption that
foreign aid is a humanitarian deed (Lumsdaine 1993), there is no reason to refrain
from transfering aid that was deemed appropriate, perhaps necessary, given the re-
cipient country’s development, destitution, and disaster-induced havoc. From either
view, there is no incentive for donors to overpromise or underdeliver.
The stark contrast between the disbursement-delay and the aid allocation scholar-
ship exists in another, more abstract sense as well. In the view of the disbursement-
delay scholars, shortfall seems to be an unpleasant bug of the aid process whose
solution merely requires attention by donors. In a nutshell, the divergence between
disbursements and commitments are manageable and idiosyncratic bugs. This is a
parallelism to the aid-growth debate. Some think there is too little aid (Sachs 2006),
others think there is too much (Easterly 2001, 2006) while both sides agree that
the track record on the e↵ectiveness of aid is mixed at best. From either view, the
observed aid continues to be suboptimal. Why does such suboptimality persist, ask
Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a)? They suggest that observed aid is actually
optimal; it is just the case that Sachs and Easterly look at aid from the wrong angle.
Similarly then, if disbursement delay persists even though donors recognize it to be
a problem and recipients obviously dislike it, why does it persist? The solution may
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be to consider that shortfall is actually part of the logic that gives rise to foreign aid
in the first place. I will show below that it is (at least) not only the proverbial bug in
the system, but that reneging on commitments is a feature of the entire foreign aid
process that comes about by donors’ strategic choices. To this end, the next section
introduces such a theory which incorporates aid commitments and disbursements as
strategic choices so that I can generate predictions about reneging.
3.3 Committing and Disbursing Foreign Aid
This section develops the rationale behind aid commitments and disbursements as
separate strategic choices. At first, I present the framework for aid commitments as
developed in a formal model by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) and extended in
Chapter 2. Afterward, I expand upon this logic by considering the donor’s incentive
to actually disburse the previously committed aid which naturally leads to insights
about aid shortfall.
3.3.1 Dual-Motive Aid Allocation
Why is foreign aid promised? Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) propose a frame-
work to understand foreign aid allocations from the perspective that it is nothing
more than a bribe. Their model is based on the selectorate theory of politics, which
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centers on the assumption that state leaders tailor policy choices to ensure their sur-
vival in o ce (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003b). However, their model ignores the
possibility that politically relevant people could get utility via their government’s
seemingly humanitarian aid e↵ects. Survey results consistently show that people are
greatly supportive of foreign aid for such purposes (Lumsdaine 1993, Singer 2009).
I will call this latter enjoyment of one’s government aid for humanitarian purposes
“warm glow” (Andreoni 1990). Therefore, survival-minded political leaders should
act and provide foreign aid for humanitarian purposes even if the recipient has little
of value that could be bought through foreign aid. Chapter 2 proposes a revision to
the original model which incorporates both rationales for foreign aid. I will recap
this extended model and then use it to analyze commitments and disbursements,
respectively.
The model assumes that two states may bargain over foreign aid and policy
concessions. That is, the donor may o↵er the recipient some amount of monetary
resources (ie. foreign aid) in exchange for the recipient setting some policy to a
particular realization. Each country’s policy decisions are carried out by a leader
whose sole goal is to stay in o ce. Whether he stays in o ce depends on whether he
provides greater utility to the winning coalition than some challenger could. As the
incumbent leader does not know the winning coalition’s expected utility from the
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challenger, he simply aims to maximize his own winning coalition’s utility (Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2003b).
Consider first the sources of the donor’s winning coalition’s utility. It receives
utility from domestic policies (e.g. tax level, quality of schools), a particular policy in
the recipient country, and the extent to which it experiences warm glow from the aid
allocation. The donor leader may alter the recipient’s particular policy by providing
foreign aid. However, this policy inducement as well as all the domestic policies have
to be paid from a limited budget so that any aid inevitably reduces the extent of
domestic policies and thereby the winning coalition’s utility. Therefore, the donor
leader will only o↵er such aid-for-policy deals that increase the winning coalition’s
utility more than the loss of domestic policies hurt it.
The two e↵ects of provided foreign aid to the donor’s winning coalition work
fundamentally di↵erently. The utility from foreign aid that changes the recipient’s
policy is experienced immediately as citizens appreciate the policy change itself.
For example, if aid is used to obtain privileged access to oil, the citizens obtain
utility from the marginally lower gas price. In short and crucially for the theoretical
argument, no knowledge is required that foreign aid bought this policy change.
This is fundamentally di↵erent in the case of the warm glow-inducing e↵ect of
foreign aid. As the monetary resources leave the donor country, citizens in the donor
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country do not experience the changes in the recipient government’s policies that aid
brought about. That raises the question of under which circumstances donor citizens
would receive utility from aid for humanitarian purposes. The answer resides in the
emergening scholarly consensus that, in general, citizens’ knowledge about policies
is crucially conditional upon the news coverage that the policy receives (Zaller &
Feldman 1992, Zaller 1996, Snyder & Stro¨mberg 2010). This is also the case when it
comes to foreign policy (Baum 2002, Baum 2004, Baum & Potter 2008). Therefore,
the extent to which the donor leader’s winning coalition enjoys warm glow which lets
it credit the leader’s allocation of aid with acting in a humanitarian way depends on
the misery of the recipient as well as the volume of news coverage.
Turning to the recipient leader’s winning coalition, it cares about similar aspects
than its donor country counterpart. It derives utility from the domestic policies
and from the same policy that the donor’s winning coalition cares about and over
which the two countries’ leaders might bargain. This policy is completely under
the recipient leader’s control. If the constellation is right, both leaders can agree
to exchange monetary resources called foreign aid for setting the policy to some
proposed level; in turn, the deal has to help both leaders as otherwise it would be
rejected.
Let’s examine how foreign aid a↵ects the components of the winning coalition’s
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utility. First, foreign aid comes out of the donor’s budget and enters the recipient’s
accounts. The change in resources a↵ects the domestic policies that can be pursed.
Donor leader has to reduce the expenditure on domestic policies which his winning
coalition dislikes. At the same time, the recipient leader gets to provide more such
policies which his winning coalition appreciates. Second, if the donor leader demands
a policy change by the recipient and o↵ers enough resources for the recipient to
accept, then the donor’s winning coalition’s utility improves through the revised
policies in the recipient country. The magnitude of this increase depends on the
saliency for this policy. For the recipient’s winning coalition, the utility worsens.
Third, foreign aid also generate utility for the donor’s winning coalition through
warm glow if it learns about the recipient through news coverge and if the recipient
is actual impoverished.
With this setup, Chapter 2 provides four possible equilibrium cases. In the zero-
aid case, the donor leader does not provide any aid as no benefits to his winning
coalition can be reaped. This is the case when the possible policy concession is
not appreciated by the winning coalition (ie. low salience). The leader also cannot
bestow warm glow upon the winning coalition as either the recipient is not in poverty
or it is not covered in the news su ciently. Since giving any aid reduces domestic
expenditures, which the winning coalition dislikes, no aid will be provided.
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When the recipient leader has a policy under his control that is salient to the
donor’s winning coalition, then the two states engage in bargaining over an aid-for-
policy deal. Since all the donor wants is the policy concession, the donor leader only
o↵ers the minimum amount of aid necessary to obtain the concession. This situation
is most likely to characterize foreign aid as the donor’s saliency increases.
If it is the case that the extent of su↵ering elsewhere is large and there is news
coverage of it, then citizens’ humanitarian impulses are heeded by the leader and
aid is promised at a level below the amount necessary to buy a policy concession. In
this case, the donor simply promises aid without asking for a policy change by the
recipient. The recipient leader accepts the proposal as it beneficial to obtain more
money without having to give something up. Last and this is the selfish humanitarian
case, if the extent of the destitution is large enough that the leader pledges aid above
the minimum price necessary for the policy concession, then the leader also demands
the concession.
3.3.2 Strategic Reneging
These four constellations describe four causal mechanisms by which we observe aid
commitments from the donor to the recipient country. However, committing aid is
di↵erent from actually releasing money to be at the recipient government’s disposal.
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Most noticeably, the disbursement of promised aid occurs in tranches of varying
length. For example, Roodman (2006) points to an average duration of three years.
If commitments and disbursements are separated by time, then a tension between
releasing funds for aid and its alternative uses may arise. Specifically, since released
funds are no longer available for domestic spending, the donor government will weigh
the relative benefits from releasing the money against decreased domestic spending.
I will show that the disbursement incentives di↵er dramatically across the four cases
which let me derive my predictions about the determinants of reneging.
The first equilibrium case is the zero-aid case. If no aid is announced, then there is
nothing to renege upon and the divergence between commitments and disbursements
is trivially zero. Let’s turn to the other three cases for substantively more interesting
predictions about reneging.
Reneging in the Bargaining Case
When bargaining characterizes the donor-recipient interaction, then shirking on the
commitment is not in the donor leader’s interest. In this case, the saliency for a
donor’s winning coalition is ipso facto large enough for the donor leader to forego
domestic spending and buy the policy concession. Unless the saliency rapidly saps,
the donor continues to find the policy concession valuable and therefore has no incen-
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tive to renege on the commitment. After all, if the donor reneges, the recipient will
simply shift the policy back to its bliss point which incurs disutility for the donor’s
winning coalition. For example, when the United States pledged foreign aid to Israel
and Egypt to get both sides to agree to the Camp David Accords, the United States
faced little incentive to renege and has continued to honor the commitments ever
since (Quandt 2005). Therefore, factors that make bargaining more likely bargaining
should not be associated with reneging.
The crucial assumption behind the above prediction is that the donor’s winning
coalition’s saliency for policy concessions are stable. This may seem odd at first.
Under the view on policy making in this paper, that leaders pursue policies in order
to satisfy the winning coalition, di↵erent winning coalitions should have di↵erent
preferences over policies. That is, if the leader as well as the composition of the
winning coalition change and if the new winning coalition’s saliency for the policy is
lower, then reneging should occur even in the bargaining case. This is unlikely to be of
concern here because the above argument should matter little for the most commonly
studied donors, which I am drawing my donor sample from as well. The United
States, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, and Italy (as well as the other donors that
usually appear in the aid allocation literature) are among the most inclusive regimes
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with the largest winning coalitions relative to the population.9 This inclusiveness
should greatly dampen the fluctuations of policy saliency. If the saliency over policy
concessions is a function of who makes up the winning coalition, then a larger winning
coalition (for fixed population size) leads to less variation in saliency for successive
regimes. Therefore, the assumption about stable preferences for the usual donors
is actually grounded in the theoretical setup of the theory. Moreover, the stability
of preferences not only has a theoretical basis, but also empirical support. Carroll,
Leeds & Mattes (2012) estimate the e↵ect of changes in country leader’s support
coalitions on the overall foreign policy of that country. They report that democratic
countries’ foreign policies are almost una↵ected by changes in the societal groups
upon the which the leader draws. Leeds, Mattes & Vogel (2009) provide a similar
finding with respect to military alliance commitments.
Therefore, I believe the assumption of leader-to-leader saliency for policy conces-
sions is well-justified for the democratic donors in my data. Once more systematic
data on non-democratic donors’ commitments and disbursements become available,
we can start testing for whether those donors are associated with reneging in the bar-
gaining case under changes in the support coalition. This is left for future research.
As just argued, saliency may be stable with respect to di↵erent configurations
9 As well as relative to the selectorate size; see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003b).
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of the donor’s winning coalition, but one can think of cases in which the policy
concession is only of short-lived, value. Rarely are these concessions about long-term
alignment choices such as they were during the Cold War or since the beginning of
the so-called War on Terror (Boschini & Olofsg˚ard 2007, Fleck & Kilby 2010). More
often, they are about limited duration, perhaps one-time, policy changes.10 For
example, when the United States wanted to use military bases in Turkey in order
to better carry out the war on Iraq in 2003, the two states were bargaining over an
aid-for-policy deal. As a swift, victorious military U.S. campaign against Iraq was
universally expected, the value of Turkey’s policy concession to the United States
was merely short-lived. As many aid projects usually have disbursement schedules
that are spread out over years (Roodman 2006), one might expect that the donor
would renege on the commitments as soon as the utility from the policy concession
is reaped. If that were the case, then aid committed in the bargaining case would
also be associated with reneging.
Such a possibility is not consistent with my theoretical model. Recall that in
the model by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) as well as in the modification
in the previous chapter, the recipient has the option of rejecting any aid-for-policy
deal that the donor leader proposes. Even though it is not explicitly part of the
10 I am thankful to Matt Winters for raising this point.
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model, it is certainly implied that the recipient would reject any deal in which the
payment is not su ciently credible within the expected timeframe of the policy
concession. Therefore, unless recipients consistently overestimate either the duration
of the donor’s saliency for a particular policy concession or the donor’s willingness
to honor the commitment, the donor should not be able to renege without losing
the sought-after policy concession. Returning to the United States-Turkey example,
Turkey ended up rejecting the deal; it can be speculated that Turkey may have
viewed the loans to be prone to be reneged upon after the expected defeat of Iraq.
How can the donor assure that its aid package is credible? For example, the donor
can tailor the duration of the foreign aid schedule to match the time for which the
policy concession is needed.11 In the case of policies with temporarily limited saliency
for the donor, this might mean that the donor o↵ers shorter aid projects or higher
shares of cash and budget support aid, which are simply paid out right away. In the
Turkey case, the United States had o↵ered loans, grants, and debt relief; it stands to
speculate that if the United States had o↵ered Turkey instantaneous budget support,
cash transfers, or more grants than loans, it may have obtained the rights to use the
bases for the Iraq War. These novel hypotheses–bargaining over temporary policy
concessions is associated with shorter duration projects and greater proportions of
11 Note that Roodman (2006) only reported the average duration of aid projects. We still know
very little about projects’ durations and disbursement schedules in general.
94
immediate cash payments–are examined in future work.
In short, reneging should be unrelated to factors that drive democratic donors
toward bargaining with the recipient over policy concessions. For non-democratic
donors, this may not be the case if a new support coalition happens to value less
the policy concessions that the previous government had bought; however, due to
limitations data for non-democracies’ aid giving, this hypothesis remains to be tested
in future work.
Reneging in the Humanitarian Case
Turning to the humanitarian case now, I argue that the donor leader consistently has
incentives to not release tranches of promised aid and thereby renege upon previous
commitments. The leader can exploit the necessity for his winning coalition to learn
about aid activities through the news. If citizens remain unaware, aid disbursements
would go unrewarded by the citizens which should impel leaders to save the money
and spend it domestically. Further, if the news fails to point out that reneging
occurred, then the costs of reneging to the leader are slim and he should do it more.
To understand how such news patterns generate incentives to renege, let’s turn to
the pattern of news coverage.
From the perspective of this theoretical argument, a foreign aid project has two
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phases. First, it is announced and resources are set aside, and then is executed over,
at times, many years by releasing funds that are put at the recipient’s disposal. At
each step, news coverage occurs and provides messages about the donor leader’s aid
activities to the otherwise unknowing public. Figure 3.1 illustrates this by providing
an overview of the messages that are contained in the foreign aid news coverage in
2009 and 2010 in a random sample of aid-related articles in the New York Times and
the Washington Post.12 The figure shows the news messages about aid commitments
and actual disbursement, whereas the bottom shows the fraction of articles that pro-
pose aid be and other, aid-related articles; this last category is a residual category.
Even though coverage of explicit aid announcement is relatively rare in foreign aid
news in general, spent aid is mentioned more often. This should not be surprising
as announcements are made usually once and garner attention, whereas there can
be repeated references to ongoing projects.13 Either type of messages provide infor-
mation to the citizens about their leader’s aid e↵orts so that they can credit him
(Zaller 1996). As assumed above, both types of articles should let the leader reap
warm glow benefits.
This pattern is skewed even more favorably for the leader in the special yet
12 Figure 3.1 are the proportion estimates from a Multinomial model with a (flat) Dirichlet prior.
See the appendix for details.
13 In the coding, I assumed that references like, “The United States provided X in assistance to
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Figure 3.1 : Content of Messages on Foreign Aid.
important case of natural disasters elsewhere in the world and foreign aid given in
response to them. Eisensee & Stro¨mberg (2007, Figure I) show how news coverage
in the United States of the disaster spikes right when a disaster happens and then
quickly saps thereafter. Roughly a month after the disaster, attention has faded
almost entirely.
The leader can exploit this pattern. When the attention by the media is high such
as during the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the leader makes aid commitments
during these times, guaranteeing that the seemingly humanitarian deeds are seen by
the masses. However, as time passes and news attention wanes, the leader has in-
centives to renege on the commitments at the time of scheduled disbursement. This
asymmetry in news attention and thereby in citizens’ crediting the leaders allows the
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leader to make commitments and to generate warm glow, but also incentivizes him
to renege upon the original commitments. The situation is similar in the selfish hu-
manitarian case. Therefore, in the humanitarian case, the reneging on aid promises
should occur and increase in the initial promise. Finally, we should consider the
role that the recipient leader can play in this as surely he does not like to forego
previously promised money. He is, however, powerless in this situation. Recall that
in the humanitarian case, the recipient leader was not asked to change his domestic
policy; for him, aid was a pure transfer. Even though the full committed amount is
preferable to him than the after-reneging amount, he still will not reject the deal as
even less-than-promised aid is better than no aid at all. So there is no reason in my
model for the recipient to reject an o↵er even though it is clear that some, most, or
even almost all of the promised aid will go undelivered.14
It is worth revisiting the argument from above about whether the expected reneg-
ing may not be due to over-time changes in who makes up the winning coalition.
First, whereas there is widespread disagreement within societies over the “right”
taxes, etc., surveys indicate broad support for foreign aid for humanitarian pur-
poses.15 Therefore, the di↵erences in saliency over the types of policy concessions
14 Nevertheless, recipients complain occasionally about unfulfilled promises. However, this is rare
as well as such complaints are a (strict) subset of the number of articles in Figure 3.2.
15 Specifically, surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign A↵airs since the 1970s demonstrate
that respondents highly approve of aid that is believed to be helping Sub-Saharan African and
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should have greater variation than those over the valuation over helping the poor.
That said, as argued above, the fact that major donors are democracies, and in par-
ticular all of the donors in this study, these di↵erences should matter barely here.
Second, the incentive to renege in the humanitarian case is not driven by a change in
preferences due to shifting winning coalitions, but by an assumption about what the
newspapers cover. This pattern should hold without regard to who is in the winning
disaster-struck countries (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991,
1995, 1999; Chicago Council on Global A↵airs 2002). The Eurobarometer and several OECD
surveys report responses indicative of the same pattern (Eurobarometer 1997, OECD 2003,
Eurobarometer 2009). Several single-country surveys report similar results; see for Australia
(AusAID 2001), for Poland (Polish Ministry for Foreign A↵airs 2010), and for the United
Kingdom (Department for International Development 2010). See Riddell (2007) on this topic
more generally.
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coalition. Therefore, reneging in the humanitarian case here is inherent in the logic
of game and not due to changes in parameters.
Empirical Predictions
Each of the four cases has unique expectations about a donor’s reneging. However,
these are not yet amenable to empirical testing. The theoretical cases here present
sharply demarcated scenario that do not have equally sharp counterparts in reality.
Rather, one should think of them poles between which a case might lie (Heinrich
2013). For instance, if a case is mostly driven by bargaining between the donor and
the recipient, but humanitarian motives matter a bit, then the prediction is not
that all promised aid will be reneged upon. Further, it is likely the case that the
disbursement delay factors, such as misaligned bureaucracies and hurdles to release
tranches, are also at play.
The four cases o↵er nonetheless insights into the patterns on reneging even if
reality is obviously less sharp as the theoretical cases. First, increasing saliency makes
bargaining more likely, which also increases foreign aid promises and disbursements.
In the bargaining case, reneging does not occur. Therefore, empirically, the saliency
should be unrelated to the amount of reneging we see.
The empirical predictions are therefore that anything that makes bargaining be-
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tween the donor and the recipient more likely should not be associated reneging.
These factors are those that capture the saliency of the recipient’s policy concessions
to the donor’s winning coalition. In contrast, factors that make it more likely that
the humanitarian (and selfish humanitarian) motives drive the aid allocation also
make the commitments exceed the disbursement. These are the news coverage of
the recipient and the extent of the recipient’s poverty. The prediction about reneg-
ing in the latter case is predicated upon the news coverage. In absence of a news
increase, the reneging should not increase. Therefore, I also expect that more misery
in the recipient in the absence of greater news coverage should not be associated
with increased reneging.
• The donor’s saliency over policy concessions should be unrelated to the amount
of reneging.
• As the extent of the recipient’s misery increases under high news coverage, the
greater the reneging.




This section takes the predictions to the data. The major challenge in testing lies
in the absence of data on the the amount of reneging by a donor to a recipient in
a year. I will first outline my research design that uses data on disbursement and
commitments in order in order test my predictions. Then, I introduce the data and
the statistical model.
3.4.1 Data on Commitments, Disbursement, and Reneging
The outcome of interest is the divergence between aid commitments and disburse-
ments for a given time period. Data on the two latter variables is available from
the most commonly-used source, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee’s
(DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS). However, its data on commitments relate
to the year in which they were announced and do not contain information about the
years in which they were meant to be disbursed. A substantial part of the announced
aid are multi-year commitments for projects. Therefore, the annual disbursement and
commitment figures from the CRS data are not comparable from the perspective of
my theory, which focuses on the relation between disbursed aid and aid scheduled
for disbursement for a year. Therefore, the raw data from the CRS is not directly
amenable to construct a measure of the degree of reneging.
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Scholars’ previous approaches to measuring overpromise are unsatisfactory for
di↵erent reasons. First, Odedokun (2003) ignores the issue and compares the raw
CRS data. For the aforementioned reasons, this approach is unlikely to produce
reliable results. Second, Bul´ıˇr & Hamann (2008) use surrogate data to proxy for the
donors’ commitments and disbursements in a year. They use long-term loans put
together in the WorldBanks Global Development Finance database. However, it is
unclear how well the logic of loan commitments and disbursements correspond to the
respective logic for foreign aid. Further, the authors pool the loans for each recipient
so that the bilateral e↵ects of pledging and reneging remain hidden. Last, Celasun
& Walliser (2008) adjust the CRS data and assume, following Roodman (2006), that
the average duration of aid projects is three years. Under that assumption, they
recalculate the aid commitment data by allocating a third contemporaneously, one,
and two years ahead, respectively. This approach is also not satisfactory as we know
little about the distribution the duration and sizes of aid projects and in particular
about whether these features covary with other factors.16 By partitioning data in
such a way, one invites bias of unknown size and direction into the study.
I propose a novel data-driven, statistical approach that links well-studied deter-
minants of foreign aid to disbursements and commitments. The approach has three
16 See, for example, Kilby (2011).
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steps. First, simple accounting identities and a small thought experiment let me
find a situation in which the announcements in and the commitments for a year
would actually be the same. This is the case when the factors that give rise to the
announcements were to stay the same over time. If none of the determinants change
with time, then donors would announce the same amount every year. As each an-
nouncement is scheduled for disbursement in some year, it follows that the sum of
commitments made for a particular year has to equal the announcement for any year.
Second, this assumption is obviously not met for the raw data about disbursements
as determinants change. Therefore, I will have to turn to a statistical model in order
to be able to learn about the relationship between current and past determinants to
current disbursement. In the third and last step, I can set the current and lagged
determinants to any values and simulate comparable counterfactual cases. By vary-
ing these determinants, I can test my predictions. I will develop this approach more
formally in the following.
When would the announcement in a year be equal to the commitment for a year?
Let at and ct be the announcement and commitment of foreign aid, respectively.
Announcements are made in a particular year and are recorded in the CRS data.
Fractions of each announcement get scheduled for disbursement in some year; I shall
call these commitments for a particular year. Therefore, the announcement in a year
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is decomposed into commitments for future years, which I denote as c˜(t+k)t (xt). The
subscript refers to the period of the announcement, the superscript to the scheduled
disbursement year, and xt captures the factors that determine the announcement




t (xt) where K is some integer
denoted the farthest distance between announcement and scheduled disbursement.
Since c˜ is a fraction of the announcement at time t, it is the factors at time t that
determine its value as well. Turning now to the commitments for a particular year,
notice that it has a similar accounting structure. All aid committed for a year t, ct, is





The above accounting suggests one circumstance in which an announcement in
a year is equal to the commitment for that year, namely when all c˜ are the same,
ie. c˜(t+k)t (xt) = c˜
(t)
t k(xt k) for all k 2 {0, 1, ..., K}. As each c˜ is determined by
factors at the time of the original announcement, then all c˜t are equal when the
determinants are the same, ie. xt K = xt K+1 = ... = xt+K . Put more succinctly, if
none of the determinants that a↵ect aid announcements change over time, then the
aid announcement and the commitment for a year would be the same. In this case,
the donor would announce the same amount every year and would disburse it over
K years. If the announcement is unchanging from year to year, it has to follow then
that the commitments for each year are equal to the announcements. I now have a
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circumstance in which I can use the available data on announcements as if they were
commitment data.
The assumption required so that announcements in a year can be treated if
they were commitments for a year is obviously unmet in the CRS disbursement
data. Disbursement is a function of what was committed for the current period from
previous periods less a fraction (⌘k(xt)) due to reneging, ie. dt = dt(xt K , ..., xt) =PK
k=0 ⌘k(xt)c˜
(t)
t k(xt k). It is obvious then that disbursement is a function of past and
current determinants of aid announcements and of the incentive to renege. Hence,
the raw data does not follow the assumption that I require to treat announcements
and commitments as the same. A statistical model that relates current and past
determinants to the current disbursement can remedy this situation. Once the model
is estimated, I can set the determinants of the past and current determinants to some
preset values and simulate the disbursement as if the determinants in the past had
been the same as the present. That is, I can simulate dˆt(xt K , ..., xt) = dˆ(x˜).
I construct the degree of reneging as dˆ(xt)  at(xt). Using a statistical model for
the announcements as well, I gain even more flexibility as I can also freely vary the x˜
for the announcements so that I can study the divergence between aˆ(x˜) and dˆ(x˜) for
































The preceding discussion lays out how I can simulate annually comparable dis-
bursement and commitment figures from a statistical model using the CRS data and
current and lagged predictors. By varying the levels of the predictors, I can exam-
ine by theoretical predictions. To this end, I first describe the operationalizations
of all predictors discussed in the theoretical section. Then, I introduce the statis-
tical model I use to estimate the relationship between the predictors and the two
outcomes. Last, I will simulate the amount of reneging as the values of the factors
change to test the predictions from my theory.
3.4.2 Data and Models
The theoretical discussion above not only o↵ers predictions about the divergence
of commitments and disbursements, it also guides how to model the amounts of
commitments and disbursement (ie. the x). This simulation-driven approach thus
requires xt to feature not only the variables that let me test my arguments (news,
donor saliency, recipient’s misery), but also the other variables that matter for the
amounts of commitment and disbursements. The more accurate my statistical model
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generates predictions, the less biased my tests will be. I will first introduce the
operationalization for the variables that I am testing for; then I will introduce those
that help me model the amounts.
First, the saliency of the donor for policy concessions is measured by a set of vari-
ables which conceptually mostly follow Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a), but ac-
tually are used ubiquitously in empirical models of foreign aid (e.g. Neumayer 2003).
I use former colonial relations and the (logarithm of the) geographic distance between
the donor and the recipient. Interest in the policies elsewhere usually declines with
geographic distance (Schumpeter 1942). Also, politics and policies in former colonies
occupy a significant place in a donor’s policy debate (Rioux & Van Belle 2005) so
that changes in policies there should be more valuable. For example,Schraeder (1995)
and Hook, Taylor & Schraeder (1998) write of a consensus in France for working on
preserving the French linguistic and cultural legacy in former colonies. Therefore, ce-
teris paribus, aid transfers are more valuable to France if they make a former colony
to increase French studies on school curricula. The data on distance comes from
Gleditsch & Ward (2001) and on colonial relations from the Issues of Correlates of
War Project (Hensel 2006).
Second, my theory is mostly about recipient’s misery that is visible. Therefore,
I rely on natural disasters in the recipient country as a measure of the extent of
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misery. Specifically, I use the number of people a↵ected by natural disasters (CRED
2011). This variable is appropriate as public opinion surveys generally demonstrate
that citizens are most favorably disposed towards aid for disaster-struck countries.17
Therefore, the variable should capture well the increased humanitarian benefits that
are ascribed to the leader for giving aid.
Third, I am measuring news coverage using the data by Heinrich (2013). The
collection records the number of times that a selected major newspaper in the donor
country mentions each recipient country every year. These newspapers are the
Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung for Germany, the New York Times for the United States, Neue
Zu¨rcher Zeitung for Switzerland, the Irish Times for Ireland, and Corriere della Sera
for Italy. These counts were logged and then standardized by donor (mean-centered
and divided by two standard deviations) to account for uneven publication volumes
by the newspapers. As demanded by the theory, the news variable is interacted with
all measures of the humanitarian incentives.
With the variables of theoretical importance operationalized, let’s turn to the
other variables that the theory suggests matter for the commitment and disburse-
ment amounts. These center mostly on the donor’s capacity to provide and the the
recipient’s ability to bargain. First, the recipient country’s size of the winning coali-
17 See the citations in Footnote 15.
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tion is usually measured using the measure proposed in Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003b). However, I only have one of its subcomponents available until 2004 so that
my study would cover only a small number of years. Instead, I will proxy the di↵er-
ence between a large and a small winning coalition by looking at democracies and
non-democracies as measured by the Polity2 variable. I use a dummy which is equal
to one if the Polity2 variable is above six. Second, I calculate the available resources
to the recipient and donor governments by using the respective data on governments’
share of gross-domestic product (GDP) multiplied by the GDP, which is subsequently
logged; data comes from Penn World Table (Heston, Summers & Aten 2011). Last,
I include a third-order polynomial of time as well as a full set of recipient and donor
dummies to account for temporal and cross-sectional heterogeneity.
The data on commitments and disbursements comes from the OECD DAC Cred-
itor Reporting System (CRS). Coverage is often a problem for data on foreign aid as
the CRS records donor-reported foreign aid. If donors do not provide appropriate in-
formation, such aid is missing from the CRS. To ensure high data quality, I construct
my panel by only using donor-years with data coverage above 90% for disbursement
and commitments. This metadata on coverage comes from the CRS as well. Further,
some donors’ commitment data are not commensurate with the OECD criteria to
evaluate coverage; I drop therefore Canada, Portugal, Spain, and the United King-
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dom.18 However, available data on news coverage reduces the number of donors to
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States.
It merits emphasis that, even though I am relying on disasters as my measure
of recipient’s misery, I do not use humanitarian aid or emergency aid solely. For all
my analyses, I use O cial Development Assistance (ODA) figures, which includes
all aid intended for economic development and welfare of the recipient.
My simulation approach rests upon a statistical model that links current and past
factors to current aid disbursements. Therefore, I need to include lags of all predictors
in the model for aid disbursements. Two further issues arise. First, my theory does
not tell me the number of lags to include for each predictor. Second, some predictors
vary only mildly over time and are therefore strongly correlated. Commonly used
estimators have problems with high correlation as coe cients reflect only unique
variation. Both issues are dealt with by using a statistical model that performs
variable selection as part of the estimation (Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman 2009).
Specifically, I use an elastic net which, crudely speaking, divides the covariance
equally between the variables. This property of the estimator mitigates the usual
18 This leads to the following donors (and the earliest year they enter my dataset): Australia
(2001), Austria (2001), Belgium (1999), Finland (2006), France (2005), Germany (2003),
Greece (2004), Ireland (2002), Italy (2004), Japan (2003), Luxembourg (2003), Netherlands
(2001), New Zealand (2004), Norway (2005), Sweden (2006), Switzerland (2002), and United
States (2002).
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loss in e ciency that is well-known for regular linear regression models. At the
same time, the estimator “punishes” large coe cients if the data does not clearly
support them. Therefore, coe cients on irrelevant, noisy lags of predictors get shrunk
towards zero. In short, I let the model sort out how much weight ought to be given
to particular lags while at the same time not “losing” the covariance.19 To this end,
I use a Bayesian linear regression with elastic net priors on the coe cients. I rely
on the formulation and Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm developed by Kyung,
Gill, Ghosh & Casella (2010).
The disbursement and commitment models were each run for 10,000 iterations
as burn-in and then for another 20,000, saving every second draw. Convergence was
assessed by examining the Geweke statistics, autocorrelation plots, and traceplots,
which are shown in the appendix.20
3.5 Results
With the large number of parameters, separate models for commitments and dis-
bursements, logarithmically transformed and subsequently mean-centered outcome
19 I exclude the lags for variables that do not change with time. These are: geographic distance,
colonial relations, and the dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries. All other variables are
included with their contemporaneous values as well as four lags.
20 I estimated a total of 16 hyperprior specifications for the amount of shrinkage. The results
are substantively very similar to what is presented below. All figures produced from these
alternative models are available from the author.
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variables,21 several lags of predictors, and as the quantity of interesting is the change
in the commitments minus the disbursements, the substantive interpretation of the
parameters is di cult. Further, as I am using a Bayesian approach, the uncertainty of
all estimated quantities should be acknowledged as well. To overcome these di cul-
ties, I rely on graphical summaries of substantively interesting quantities of interest
(King, Tomz & Wittenberg 2000, Kastellec & Leoni 2007) and relegate the posterior
summaries of the parameters themselves to the appendix. Specifically, I compare the
amount of reneging for two di↵erent levels of the predictor(s) (such as geographic
distance or news coverage) as outlined in Equation 3.1, while holding all others at
their median or modal values (for binary variables). As I am using all after-burn in
draws, I obtain posterior distributions of the quantities of interest which naturally
accounts for the estimation uncertainty. I summarize them by reporting the 50%
and 90% central credible intervals as well as the median.22
Let’s now turn to examining the results to assess whether the reneging changes as
predicted by my theory. They are shown by groups of variables as they appear in my
theoretical model, which are bargaining determinants and humanitarian incentives.
Figure 3.3 shows reneging by whether the donor and the recipient shared a colonial
21 The latter step is done for estimating purposes (Kyung et al. 2010).
22 The estimation was carried using the logarithmic transformation of commitments and dis-
bursements. To facilitate the substantive messages, I transform all values back to the original








Figure 3.3 : Change In Reneging by Colonial Status. The black density shows
the simulated amount of reneging (in million U.S. dollars) if the donor and recipient
share a colonial past; the gray densities is for the case when there was a colonial
history.
relationship. The black density depicts when they did, the gray when they did
not. As expected by the theoretical arguments, the amount of reneging does not
change between the two cases. Assuming average values for all other covariates in
the commitment and disbursement models, the average reneging is about 2.5 million
U.S. dollars in either case.
The second operationalization of saliency is the geographic distance between the
donor and the recipient country. In Figure 3.4, the simulated amount of reneging
is graphed against distance (in kilometers), going from the lowest observed value to





















Figure 3.4 : Reneging by Geographic Distance. The abscissa shows the distance
between the donor and recipient in kilometers; the ordinate gives the amount of
reneged foreign aid in millions USD. The central line gives the median estimate,
the black polygon the central 50% credible interval, and the gray polygon the 90%
central credible interval.
central credible intervals, respectively; the line on the black polygon indicates the
median estimate. Again, as predicted by the theoretical arguments, the amount of
reneging does not change. Across the simulated values, as distance decreases (and
thereby saliency increases), the actual reneging does not change.
Whereas I predicted no relationship between bargaining variables and reneging,
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Figure 3.5 : Commitment and Disbursement by Extent of Disaster under
Heightened News.. The left hand panel shows committed foreign aid, whereas the
right hand panel the actually disbursed aid; each is depicted along the ordinate. The
abscissa gives the extent of people a↵ected by natural disasters. For an explanation
of the polygons and the central line, see the caption to Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.5 shows the aid commitments (left) and disbursements (right) as the
extent of a disaster in the recipient country increases and when there is heightened
news coverage (ie. news coverage is a standard deviation above its mean). Looking
the commitments, we see a (slight) upward trend associated with more disaster.
Particularly, the higher percentile regions of the simulated density increass stronger.
In contrast, the actual disbursements decrease slightly as the extent of the disaster
widens. Their di↵erence, that is, the degree of reneging, is shown in Figure 3.6. As
there are more than roughly 200,000 people a↵ected by disasters and when the media
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Figure 3.6 : Reneging by Extent of Disasters, Heightened News Coverage.
My expectation that increasingly harmful disasters lead to more reneging is pred-
icated on there being su cient news coverage. Figure 3.7 replicates Figure 3.6 while
setting the donor’s news coverage of the recipient to the mean. In this situation,
when news coverage is substantively lower, then the increasing extent of disasters
in the recipient countries are no longer associated with increased reneging. Instead,
reneging stays flat at around 2.5 million U.S. dollars.
Overall, my statistical results largely comport with the expectations from the
theoretical model. Mostly, when states are bargaining with each other over policy
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Figure 3.7 : Reneging by Extent of Disasters, Average News Coverage.
ated with changes in reneging. However, as the recipient appears more in misery to
the population of the donor country, commitments increase, disbursements decrease,
and thereby reneging becomes more extensive. As predicted though, this does not
occur when the awareness in the donor country is low.
3.6 Conclusion
Overall, I find support for my predicted pattern of reneging on foreign aid commit-
ments. That is, factors that lead to more foreign aid due to aid-for-policy deals (ie.
bargaining between the donor and the recipient) are generally not associated with
reneging; however, as humanitarian motives matter more, then the extent of reneg-
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ing increases if there is heightened news coverage. The evidence is supportive of my
contention that reneging is not only a bug in the foreign aid system, but actually
one of its features.
Scholars have focused the most on what determines the amount of disbursed
foreign aid. However, the amount is only one of many features in the design space
of foreign aid. This paper expands upon this by simultaneously studying the public
commitments over aid and the release of these funds over time. In this paper, I ask
a question that has received little attention: what is the optimal political design of
foreign aid? For example, aid that is disbursed comes in many variants. Foreign aid
can be tied or untied, can come as a cash transfer to the receipient, to only a specific
ministry of the recipient, or can be a project. If it is a project, how is its location
chosen? Scholars and development activists have long preached the advantages of
untied aid, but little scholarship exists into what gives rise to aid being untied.
With some notable exceptions (Winters 2010, Bush 2011, Dietrich 2012), very little
research exists that explains these features of foreign aid design.
This paper uses a theory that centers on the aid-for-policy logic and humanitarian
signaling. However, there are at least two other strands in the foreign aid literature
that could serve as the basis to theorize about the di↵erences between commitments
and disbursement of aid. In one strand, aid allocation is driven by bureaucratic
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interests and inertia (e.g. Lumsdaine 1993, Van Belle, Rioux & Potter 2004, Carey
2007). In another body of literature, scholars examine the political economy of
legislative voting on foreign aid (e.g. Fleck & Kilby 2001, Milner & Tingley 2010,
Powers, Leblang & Tierney 2010, Berger 2012). From either view, the decisions about
aid are less leader-centric and less top-down than what I proposed. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to propose and examine arguments on the politics of overpromise
from these three angles, but it is the hope that rival theories to mine emerge so that
the relative explanatory power can be judged (Kass & Raftery 1995, Clarke 2001,




This section checks the robustness of the estimates in the text with respect to priors
as well as the covariates.
In the following (Figures 3.8 through 3.11), the di↵erent hyperpriors are denoted
by a four-digit tag. The first two digits refer to r1 and r2, the latter two to  1 and
 2. These correspond to the parameters of the same name as used by Kyung et al.
(2010) in their Bayesian elastic net model (section 2.5 in their appendix).
A digit “1” in the tag means that a value of 1 for the corresponding parameter
was used; a digit “2” indicates the use of 10 for the parameter.
“Spec 1” refers to the covariate specification that was used in the paper, which
includes a full set of dummy variables for each donor and for each recipient. “Spec


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.8 : Reneging and Former Colony Robustness. Each panel in the
figures replicates Figure 3.4 under alternative model assumptions. In each panel,
abscissa shows the amount of reneging whereas the ordinate indicates the di↵erent
cases. Each ot gives the median estimate, each line the 90% central credible interval.
Gray dots and lines are for the second model specification, whereas the black ones










































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.9 : Reneging and Distance Robustness. This figure is a robustness







































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.10 : Reneging and Disasters (High News) Robustness. This figure









































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.11 : Reneging and Disasters (Average News) Robustness. This
figure is a robustness check for Figure 3.7. For details, see the caption to Figure 3.8.
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3.7.2 Newspaper Content Coding
I obtain all news stories on foreign aid published in the News York Times and Wash-
ington Post in 2009 and 2010 via Lexis Nexis. Specifically, I looked for articles
involving the United States and that included anything about development aid, for-
eign aid, development assistance, USAid, aid commitment, or aid pledges. This gave
a total of 1,873. I randomly coded 100 articles per year and per newspaper. For each
article, the following variables were coded. The word in italics denotes the variable
name. “NA” denotes missingness.
• Date of the article
• Newspaper in which the article appeared
• Title of the article
• Type of the article (e.g. news article, op-ed, editorial, interview, etc.)
• Was new development aid or funding Committed?
• The variable CWho23 captures the high-ranking person to have made the com-
mitment (e.g. president, USAid administrator). If the article invokes a state-
23 “C” stands for commitment.
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ment by an aid agency without further specifics, then just the agency is listed.
If Commit=0, then CWho=NA.
• Was there an Event at which the commitment was made public? An event
can be the G7/G8 meetings, the UN General Assembly meetings, at a U.S.
secretary’s visit to the recipient, etc. If Commit=0, then Event=NA.
• Who was/ were the Recipient(s)? If Commit=0, then Event=NA.
• CWhat is the commitment supposed to be used for? The variable records
the intended projects, such for education, health, etc. If Commit=0, then
CWhat=NA.
• Was already Disbursed development aid mentioned?
• The variable DWho captures the recipient nation of the disbursement. If Dis-
burse=0, then DWho=NA.
• Did the article mentioned that the donor had not lived up to previous commit-
ments? Was there any Shortfall reported? If Disburse=0, then Shortfall=NA.
• DWhat was funded? The variable records the intended projects, such for edu-
cation, health, etc. If Disburse=0, then DWhat=NA.
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• Did the article Propose something about aid? This can mean two things:
First, some prediction about a future policy was made. Second, the article
could be normative and state particular aid projects ought to be implemented.
If Disburse=1 or Commit=1, then Propose=0.
• Did the article about OtherAid related matters, such as new technologies, other
donors, etc.? If Disburse=1, Propose=1, or Commit=1, then code this field.
For Figure 3.1, I dropped all articles with Wrong=1 and sum the realizations
for Disburse, Commit, Propose, and OtherAid as a, b, c, and d, respectively. These
reflect the messages and technically not the number of articles; 17% of the articles
contain disbursement and commitment messages. I estimate the proportions of the
messages in the aid articles through a multinomial model. After assigning a (flat)
conjugate Dirichlet prior distribution, a Dirichlet (↵ = (1 + a, 1 + b, 1 + c, 1 + d))
posterior distribution follows. The densities in Figure 3.1 summarize the characterize
the proportion estimate.
The estimation of the share of reneging messages among all news stories and only
disbursement stories, respectively, proceeds by using a Binomial model. Let e be all
stories in which the donor was reported to have reneged on a commitment. Assigning
a (flat) Beta prior, the resulting posterior is a Beta(1+e, 1+a+b+c+d) distribution
when considering all aid news stories and Beta(1 + e, 1 + b) when only looking at
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disbursement stories. Figure 3.2 are the histograms of the posterior draws.
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Chapter 4
Does Foreign Aid Cause Governmental Killings?
4.1 Introduction
It is by now a widely accepted notion that politicians seek to hold on to their o ce
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003a, Mayhew 2004), which they seek to achieve by mul-
titude of means. These come in familiar variants, such as traveling to tend to their
constituents (Fenno 1978), visiting battleground states, and fundraising (see for ex-
ample Bartels (1985) and Doherty (2012)), and tailoring policies to their constituents
(e.g. Bickers & Stein 2000).
History suggests that the use of violence is certainly not beyond politicians
(Pinker 2011). For example, diversionary theory suggests that governments fac-
ing domestic woes may initiate violence elsewhere to divert attention (Ostrom Jr &
Job 1986, Chiozza & Goemans 2011). However, such violence need not be directed at
people elsewhere. Repression and genocide are most often explicitly aimed at people
within the politician’s country (Har↵ 2003, Davenport 2007).
Leaders seek to retain their o ce in order to accrue the benefits and are not
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above using violence to this end. Yet, as governmental violence is not ubiquitous,
its use cannot always be the best action. Further, whereas leaders should generally
prefer being in o ce over leaving it, the relative value for holding it di↵ers across
cases.
This chapter considers how receiving foreign aid a↵ects the relative propensity of
governments to act violently in order to maintain power. The focus is on how foreign
aid a↵ects the (relative) value of holding o ce and how it modifies the decision to use
violence against citizens. The research question is thus whether foreign aid causes
governmental killings.
Why should we focus on foreign aid? A quick glance across the literature on
development countries suggests two central observations. First, these countries have
a higher conflict propensity (Collier 2007, Blattman & Miguel 2010), and second
they receive much of the foreign aid in the world (Easterly 2009, Wright & Winters
2010, Tierney, Nielson, Hawkins, Timmons Roberts, Findley, Powers, Parks, Wilson
& Hicks 2011). Even though this observation is purely correlational, it turns out that
some simple reasoning stemming from the rich literature on the political economy of
governance leads directly to a causal link from foreign aid to violence. This suggests
an a rmative answer to the research question. Assuming that killing people who vie
for the incumbent’s o ce makes the incumbent’s political tenure safer, then killing
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citizens is an attractive option for the government. However, this tenure-assisting
benefit does not come freely, as killing people also rattles the productive sector of
the economy. This is the case as, for one, killing people literally removes workers
and thereby economic output and tax revenue, and, for the other, killing signals a
tumultuous landscape which tends to keep investors away(Blanton & Blanton 2007).
Either ramification shrinks the pie which the incumbent can appropriate.
Foreign aid, however, may dampen the link between killings and the adverse
consequences thereof. As a country receives more foreign aid, the importance of
labor, taxes, and foreign investment to the economy flags, and thereby the nega-
tive economic consequences of possible governmental killings decrease. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, governmental killings should be more likely to occur as reliance on
aid increases.
Whereas the focus is on governmental killings, the argument is broader. The
explanatory locus of the theoretical argument is not that killings result in death,
but they render opponents unable to challenge the o ce-holder. However, there are
other policies that work equivalently, such as imprisoning and disappearing people.
I shall call this class of actions “removals.” It is distinct from other policies, such
as bribes (Dal Bo´ 2007, Finan & Schechter 2012), the pursuit of “sound” policies
to make people happy (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003a), or political cooptation
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(Gandhi 2008, Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009b) as removal does not seek to
placate an opposing actor, but to render him unable to threaten the incumbent
politician.
This chapter provides an estimate of the causal e↵ect of receiving foreign aid on
the propensity of a government to not only kill its citizens, but also to disappear and
imprison them for political reasons. I find that, surprisingly, receiving aid has either
a negative or an essentially zero e↵ect on whether recipients of foreign aid engage in
the removal of citizens from political life.
Obtaining causal e↵ects from observational data is far from trivial. The most
credible evidence could be obtained through a randomized controlled experiment
but for obvious reasons such an approach is neither feasible nor ethically desirable.
Hence I have to turn to observational data. I confront the di culties in estimating a
causal e↵ect from observational data by using an estimator that allows me to draw on
the considerable previous research on the causes of foreign aid allocations as well as
on the causes of governmental killings. Specifically, I will turn to Bayesian Additive
Regression Trees (BART) as introduced by Chipman, George & McCulloch (2002,
2007, 2010), who are referred to as CGM henceforth .
This paper will first derive more rigorously the prediction that aid causes gov-
ernments to remove citizens from political life with higher probability. To this end, I
133
will resort to the formal model by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010) who show how
natural resources a↵ect a government’s propensity to engage in mass killings. I use
the often-assumed budgetary equivalence between natural resources and foreign aid
(Smith 2008, Morrison 2009) to argue that their theoretical results apply directly to
the research question of this paper. Next, I will outline my approach to estimating a
causal e↵ect from observational data using BART. Subsequent sections of the paper
present the results and o↵er a discussion of them.
4.2 “Free Resources,” Aid, and Governmental Killing
Before proceeding to formally studying how aid a↵ects killings specifically and re-
movals generally, it is worth considering what the central explanatory loci of such a
model should be. I propose that there are two such desiderata. First, the model
needs to allow for a government to decide whether (or to which extent) to use
resources to reduce the number of another actor that is vying to run the govern-
ment. Obviously, without such a possible action, one could not o↵er insights into
the research question. Second, a country’s foreign aid needs to a↵ect the available
resources. This budgetary feature of aid is widely accepted by foreign aid scholars
(Remmer 2004, Morrison 2009, Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010a).
The formal model by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010) already comports with
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these desiderata. Specifically, the authors of the model seek to explain the onset
of governmental (mass) killings against citizens.1 They directly study the decisions
of an incumbent who seeks to hold onto power and to extract as much as possible
from the governmental resources. There is a second group which struggles to occupy
that role. The incumbent seeks to prevent this group from being victorious. One
option in his toolbox is to undercut the opponents’ fighting strength by reducing
the number of active members in the opposition group. Whereas such an action can
have many manifestations within the class of removal actions, for style’s sake, I will
provide argument using killings as the policy.
I will first review the model by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010), and then ex-
amine the propositions it makes about the resource base and governmental violence.
The authors present their hypotheses with respect to natural resources as part of
“unearned income.” Subsequently, I will argue that their results apply to foreign aid
as well.
The game in Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010) features two groups vying for
control of the government and its decision-making apparatus. Successfully holding
the government is beneficial to a group as the statal apparatus allows for the redis-
tribution of resources and can be used to carry out the killing of the opposition. The
1 See Gregory, Schro¨der & Sonin (2011) and Conrad & DeMeritt (2013) for related arguments.
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gain from killing people is that smaller transfers have to be made which means that
the incumbent gets to keep more resources. The government obtains all its resources
from tax revenue from the citizens’ labor (under an exogenous tax rate) and from
the sale of natural resources; the entire governmental budget gets redistributed to
the citizens albeit possibly unevenly. The game unfolds as follows: At the first stage,
the incumbent and opposition groups choose to invest into their fighting abilities. If
fighting occurs, the victor becomes the new incumbent and runs the government; if
there is no conflict, then the incumbent group remains in power. At the last stage
of the game, the winner decides how many people of the opposition group to kill
and sets the new policy of budget transfers.2 The main objective of the actors to
appropriate as much as possible from the statal resources.
Of central importance to this chapter is the the strategic murder of the opposition
by the incumbent which may occur at the last stage of the game.3 It has two e↵ects
on the incumbent group at that stage. First, killing people reduces the future fighting
capabilities of the opposition such that the incumbent group can more safely secure a
greater part of the statal resources in this period. This is the case as there are fewer
2 It is possible that there is a some minimum share less than which the incumbent group cannot
redistribute; see Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010, p. 13).
3 I will not characterize the full equilibrium of the game as the equilibrium levels for the fighting
e↵orts are not of interest per se in this paper. It su ces to note that the optimal choice for
the number of people to kill is independent of any history of the game (Esteban, Morelli &
Rohner 2010, p. 14).
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people such that there is less after-tax income that could be spent on future fighting
e↵orts. By killing members of the opposition group, the incumbent can undercut the
future resources of the other group. Second, if there are fewer people in the state,
then there is a smaller tax base and thus less tax revenue that gets extracted. That
leads to smaller statal resources and thus less money that can be redistributed. The
incumbent group likes the first e↵ect, but obviously dislikes the latter.
Consider now the e↵ect that natural resources have on the choice of the number
of people to be killed. First, they do not a↵ect how the killing reduces the future
fighting ability of the opposition. Thereby, they also do not influence how little the
incumbent has to redistribute to the opposition. However, ceteris paribus, natural
resources increase the total resources that can be appropriated by the incumbent.
Second, natural resources lessen the negative consequences from killing people on
the tax base. If they make up a greater proportion of the budget, then a given loss
in tax revenue after killing a number of people is less consequential. These insights
drive the model’s central results for governmental killings. In the presence of natural
resources, killings by the government become more likely as it expands the range of
parameter values for which the optimal number of killing people is greater than zero.4
This happens because natural resources reduce the negative e↵ects of a smaller tax
4 Respecting a nuance of their model, if the parameter values make a complete extermination
of the opposition the optimal choice, then an increase in “unearned income” does not change
the probability of mass killings; see Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010, 3.2).
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base from there being fewer people.
Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010) formulate their model and discuss the results
with reference to natural resources. More precisely, they use a theoretical variable
which is set up to be distinct from tax revenue in that it constitutes revenue inde-
pendent of the number of people and the level of taxes. Smith (2008) dubs this part
of a government’s budget “unearned income.” Smith, Bueno de Mesquita & Smith
(2010a), Ahmed (2012), and, most prominently, Morrison (2009) assume that there is
an equivalency between natural resources and foreign aid in that both are “unearned
income,” which would suggest that the results by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010)
would seamlessly apply to foreign aid’s e↵ect on governmental killings as well. I will
argue that this is the case but only after a detour in the argument.
Can we treat foreign aid as “unearned income,” as equivalent to natural resources
in a straightforward way? Such an interpretation does not square with a prominent
strand in the theories of foreign aid. Even though I will argue that the answer ends
up being a rmative, we need to pause and consider the argument. Recent work on
foreign aid presents a “political economy” of it (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009a)
in which aid might be “unearned,” but is not free for the recipient. Building on the
view by Morgenthau (1962), Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) see aid as a bribe
to the recipient government such that it does something it would not otherwise do
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and that is to the donor’s liking. If the recipient has to incur some cost in order to
obtain aid, then aid does not come freely to the recipient as do the natural resources
in the model by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010). In that sense aid is neither free,
nor “earned” through taxation.
Does “unearned” but not necessarily “free” aid a↵ect the result on the recipient’s
propensity to kill citizens? First, the increase in the statal resources remains. Even
though the recipient may have to incur some cost in order to obtain aid, aid still
adds to revenue obtained through tax and thus increases the budget, thereby making
the budget less dependent on taxation. Second, the result that the recipient obtains
aid necessitates that some cost was incurred. Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a)
model the cost of a policy change by the recipient as a fixed cost of variable salience.
This cost of a policy change should not a↵ect the central result. For one, there is no
reason to presume that the cost a↵ects the revenue from taxation and would thereby
undo the monetary e↵ects of aid. For the other as postulated by Bueno de Mesquita
& Smith (2009a), the aid-for-policy deal has to be beneficial to both countries when
it occurs. If the recipient was not going to benefit from the increased resources, it
would never have agreed to the deal in the first place. Eo ipso, getting aid implies
that the recipient benefitted from it in that aid augments the available resources.
The view that aid is one part of an aid-for-policy deal may suggest that aid is not
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free, but its e↵ect on lessening the dependence on taxes remains and therefore should
contribute to the decision to kill people.
Whereas Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) model that the logic of aid-for-
policy models apply every time, this need not be the case. In Chapters 2 and 3, I
argue and demonstrate that donors do not always ask for a policy change in return
for aid. Such aid that is “free” as well as “unearned” happens when the donor cares
little about any policy that is under the recipient’s control. It is well known that
the donor’s own supporters prefer seeing poorer countries be helped (Lumsdaine
1993, Page & Bouton 2006, Riddell 2007). At the margin, even in the absence of a
policy of interest, the donor leader should still want to help more destitute countries
if this gets honored by those that keep the leader in power. However, this is not
as straightforward. People tend to know very little about foreign aid and can in
most cases not assess how much the donor leader helped a poorer country. Knowing
that, the donor leader has no incentive to help out if no-one knows about it. A
large body of work shows that people can be aware of foreign policy decisions which
allows them to judge the leader’s performance on foreign aid. This can happen under
identifiable circumstances, namely when the media directs attention to plight of other
countries. This is reflected in the large number of studies that have shown a close
connection between media coverage and the amount of foreign aid that is provided.
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(Payaslian 1996, Van Belle 2003, Van Belle, Rioux & Potter 2004, Drury, Olson &
Van Belle 2005, Stro¨mberg 2007, Potter & Van Belle 2009). If aid is solely given to
placate caring supporters without an interest in seeing policy changed, then aid is
actually “free” as well as “unearned” revenue for the recipient and should have the
e↵ects predicted by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010).
4.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I provide an estimate of the treatment e↵ect of foreign aid on the
government’s propensity to kill citizens as well as on the use of other means to
remove citizens from political life. First, I introduce the operationalizations of the
key variables (outcomes, treatment, confounders). After that, I outline the intuition
behind the estimator, BART, to obtain the causal quantities. As BART is a relatively
recent innovation and has barely been used by political scientists or scholars of foreign
aid, its merits and workings will be discussed.5
4.3.1 Data & Variables
The outcome of primary interest is the recipient government’s use of domestic killings.
I operationalize this concept through two variables. First is the dichotomous indica-
5 The small number of uses include Green & Kern (2012) and Kourtellos, Tan & Zhang (2007).
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tor by Har↵ (2008) which assesses whether there was a genocide or politicide ongoing
in a given country in a year.6 Such an event is defined in the data set when “authori-
ties physically exterminate enough (not necessarily all) members of a target group so
that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to their rule or interests.”7 Opera-
tionally, the governmental authorities’ complicity in the deeds must be established,
the actions must be part of a pattern and not a one-time event, and the victims
be unarmed civilians. This largely matches how Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010)
model the governmental killings.
I use a second operationalizations using “extrajudicial killings” by the govern-
ment as coded as part of the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) human rights data project
(Cingranelli & Richards 2010). The variable codes in an ordinal manner the murders
by government o cials without due process resulting from “deliberate, illegal, and
excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state
whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.” This is some-
what looser than Har↵’s coding as it is not required that the targets come from one
specific group. Random but frequent murder by the government would constitute
governmental killings under CIRI but not in Har↵’s data. I dichotomize the original
three-categorical variable such that it takes on a one if the extrajudicial killings were




As argued above, the theoretical arguments and expectations for the data extend
seamlessly to other means by which governments may remove citizens from political
life, which I called removal. CIRI provides two further measures that comport with
this notion. First, their variable called “political imprisonment” measures incarcer-
ation for critique or protest against the government, preaching, or membership in
ethnic or religious groups. Imprisonment removes people from political life, just as
killings do, but without people necessarily having to die. Second, “disappearances”
are “cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and
the victims have not been found.” Whereas disappeared people’s whereabouts are
unknown, “it is typically known by whom they were taken and under what circum-
stances.”8 As with the extrajudicial killings, I make the original three-categorical
variables binary, separating “frequent” disappearances and imprisonments from the
rest, respectively.
The treatment of interest is the amount of foreign aid that the recipient country
receives. Whereas the raw aid inflow is often the quantity of interest (such as in
the preceding two chapters), the theoretical model suggests that aid in relation to
8 The quotes are from the “Short Variable Descriptions for Indicators in the THE
CINGRANELLI-RICHARDS (CIRI) HUMAN RIGHTS DATASET” at http://www.
humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_variables_short_descriptions.pdf.
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the size of the recipient country is crucial. Therefore, I will provide estimates for
three separate yet related quantities: raw foreign aid, foreign aid per capita, and
foreign aid as a fraction of governmental resources. The data on foreign aid come
from Tierney et al. (2011), those on resources and the population from the Penn
World Tables (Heston, Summers & Aten 2011) and Gleditsch (2002), respectively.
The goal is to obtain unbiased causal estimates of how aid a↵ects the governmen-
tal choice to remove citizens from political life. The perennial issue in obtaining these
from observational data is confoundedness; that is, that there factors which a↵ect
the treatment assignment as well as the outcome. Following Pearl (2000), it su ces
to adjust for these confounding variable to remove bias. By consulting the respective
previous literatures on aid allocation and the government’s choice of killing, I obtain
the following observable confounders, which I will consider in turn.
First, scholars have long noted that there is a population bias in donors’ aid
allocations (Arvin & Drewes 2001). Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009a) explain this
finding by arguing that a greater recipient population makes donors more eager to
seek policy concessions which are paid for through aid. At the same time, Besanc¸on
(2005), Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2008), and Easterly, Gatti & Kurlat (2006)
provide evidence that governments of more populous countries tend to carry out
more killings. The data on the population of recipient country comes from Gleditsch
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(2002).
Second, natural disasters tend to prompt donors to provide more (emergency)
resources to the recipient (Drury, Olson & Van Belle 2005, Stro¨mberg 2007, Raschky
& Schwint 2012). At the same time, governments react to disasters with increased
violence (Besley & Persson 2011). I operationalize disasters twofold in this chapter.
Using the widely used data from the EM-DAT project (CRED 2011), I create a
dummy variable that takes on a one if any disaster occurred (ie. at least one per-
son was a↵ected9), and another dummy that captures a large disaster (more than
100,000 people were a↵ected). The reason for these codings is that that not only the
occurrence of a disaster matters, but also its magnitude (e.g. Keefer, Neumayer &
Plu¨mper 2011, Flores & Smith 2012).
Third, recent work on bargaining over aid-for-policy deals focuses on the recip-
ient’s political institutions as they a↵ect the aid that donors have to pay for policy
concessions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2007, 2009). More inclusive regimes are
more di cult to be bought o↵ so that they tend to receive less aid. The (increasing)
importance of institutions is corroborated by Claessens, Cassimon & Van Campen-
hout (2009). Institutions also play a crucial role in the scholarship on governmental
violence. Rummel (1995) argues and shows that democracies, because they are more
9 These include people a↵ected by droughts, earthquakes, floods, and and volcano eruptions.
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accountable, commit fewer killings; these findings are corroborated by Easterly, Gatti
& Kurlat (2006) and Wayman & Tago (2010). Similarly, the formal model by Besley
& Persson (2011) shows how more inclusive regimes are less likely to kill their own
citizens. Further, Colaresi & Carey (2008) find that the constraints on the executive
matter. I use the polity2 measure of Polity IV as an omnibus measure of institutions.
It not only captures institutionalist notions of democracy, but also partially reflects
the size of the winning coalition by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, as their measure is
constructed (mostl) from Polity.
Fourth, governmental killings are most likely during civil wars as argued by
Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay (2004). In their view, the killing of civilians is
a tool of a government in a civil conflict against a guerrilla insurgencies. The killing
of civilians is aimed to undercut insurgents’ support base. Corroborating evidence is
provided by Krain (1997) and Wayman & Tago (2010). In the aid literature, Bru¨ck
& Xu (2012) provide evidence that civil wars are associated with aid increases. Data
comes from the Correlates of War Project’ Intra-State War Data (v 4.0) (Sarkees &
Wayman 2010).
Fifth, whereas democratic and more inclusive regimes have been found to be
less likely to engage in killings, Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010) find that regimes
that are democratizing become more likely to engage in mass killings. Similarly,
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democratizing countries have been found to receive more democracy aid, a particular
subset of foreign aid (Nielsen & Nielson 2010, Bru¨ck & Xu 2012). I operationalize this
phenomenon as a dummy that takes on a one if a country’s polity2 score increases
by at least three points within a year.
Sixth, formal models of governmental violence by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner
(2010) and Besley & Persson (2011) predict that the presence of natural resources
makes mass killings more likely. The argument is analogous to the argument in this
paper why aid should make them more likely. They also supply evidence that this is
the case. Empirically, the oil reserves, oil production, and the presence of lootable
diamonds have been linked to the onset of mass killings (Querido 2009, Esteban,
Morelli & Rohner 2010). I measure natural resources through the extent of oil
reserves of the country (British Petroleum 2011).
Seventh and last, both aid and killings are autoregressive and are a↵ected by the
lag of each other. Har↵ (2003) and Besley & Persson (2011) show that killings are
strongly autoregressive and persistent once started. Past killings also a↵ect donor’s
aid allocations (Bru¨ck & Xu 2012). Flipping things around, past aid strongly a↵ects
current aid (Carey 2007) as well as changes to its levels the outbreak of domestic
violence (Nielsen, Findley, Davis, Candland & Nielson 2010). Therefore, the lags of
the outcome as well as of the aid level are accounted for.
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The assembled data has a temporal domain 1982–2004, covering 114 recipient
countries. There are a total of 2,231 state-year observations. In total, there are
95 state-years of politicides or genocides; 534 in which the government engaged in
“frequent” extrajudicial killing of citizens; 246 cases of “frequent” disappearances;
and 831 of “frequent” political imprisonment.
4.3.2 Estimation Approach
The previous theoretical work on foreign aid and governmental killings, including
Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010) which this chapter mostly relies upon, lets me
determine which theoretical variables to consider. However, knowledge of which
variables are confounders is insu cient to obtain the desired unbiased estimate of the
causal e↵ect. It also necessary to specify correctly their functional forms, including
interactions (Signorino & Yilmaz 2003).
Unfortunately, the prior work lacks the specificity to guide researchers which func-
tional forms to use. This is in particular the case in work without formal models.
More explicitly in formal models, the strategic interactions between actors (incum-
bents, supporters, rebels, donors, etc.) imply complicated structural forms for the
equilibria for either event. These di culties are exacerbated by the absence of work
that considers aid and killings simultaneously so that the right functional form for
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confounders could not be determined (Kenkel & Signorino 2012).
Whereas the ubiquitously used linear and additive estimators have been shown to
fare particularly badly when facing these problems (Signorino & Yilmaz 2003, Arena
& Joyce 2011), recent work from the machine learning literature o↵ers an escape.10 In
particular Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART) have been shown to perform
remarkably in capturing functional forms from data (see CGM, Miyamoto, Hazeyama
& Kadobayashi (2009), Zhang & Ha¨rdle (2010), and Hill (2011)).
BART combines a sum-of-trees approach together with a regularization prior
over the trees to average over many weak-learners capturing non-linear relations.
The following gives the intuition behind the estimator and explains its advantages.
The technical details can be found in the articles by CGM, and in particular in
Chipman, George & McCulloch (2010).
Let Y be a N ⇥ 1 vector of binary responses that is modeled as a function of
a vector of treatments (D) and a matrix of confounders (X). N is the number of
observations in the sample. The substantive interest lies in how the treatment a↵ects
the outcome. As the response is binary, let
10 See also Signorino & Kenkel (2011, 2012).
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Pr [Y = 1|D,X] =   [f(D;X) + ✏] ,
with ✏ ⇠ N(0,  2).  (·) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal
distribution which maps transforms the unbounded output of the function f(·) in
the unit interval as required for a probability.
The key component of BART lies in its specification of the function, f(·), that
relates the treatment and confounders to the responses. There are two foundational
elements to BART, namely a treed regression and the sum-of-trees which are reg-
ularized via a prior. I shall introduce the intuition and advantages for either in
turn.
A treed regression partitions recursively the entire predictor space into m non-
overlapping sets of observations (see Alexander & Grimshaw 1996, Hastie, Tibshirani
& Friedman 2009); each observation belongs to only one of the m groups. The means
of each group’s outcomes are M = (µ1, ..., µm). The growing of the tree occurs by
generating partitions of the data based on whether the next partition step improves
the fit to the data. One treed regression can thus be written as g(D,X;T,M), which
is a mapping of the treatment and confounders via a tree-structure into predicted
responses (M).
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It is easy to see how this naturally allows for (complex) non-linearities and inter-
actions. However, single tree regressions face issues of overfitting. After all, in the
extreme, the partition’s mean vector could be identical to the actually observed val-
ues. This would lead very poor fits for out-of-sample predictions. BART deals with
the issues by growing numerous trees. The idea is that each tree may capture some,
even idiosyncratic functional form in the data for some sample, but the contribution
of each to overall prediction is low. The more such weak learner trees point toward
the same functional relationship, the more it will come to be reflected in the predic-
tion. Typically, one allows for J = 200 trees to be grown which are subsequently





Numerous comparative evaluations point to BART’s remarkable ability to detect
patterns in data (see again CGM, Miyamoto, Hazeyama & Kadobayashi (2009),
Zhang & Ha¨rdle (2010), and Hill (2011)). To the extent that the set of covariates
used to model the response contains crucial information but lacks the interactions and
11 Importantly, the growth and proliferation of trees is kept in checked by a regularization prior.
For the details about estimation and regularization, see the articles by CGM.
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transformations, BART produces substantially more accurate estimates than vanilla
regressions. Further, as BART is a Bayesian approach, its estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods produces a posterior distribution and thus accounts
naturally for the statistical uncertainty in estimations.
The parameters and grown trees from BART models are di cult to interpret.
For each iteration of the sampling, there are (likely) many terminal nodes for each
of the usually 200 trees. Aside from the large number of parameters, the trees
themselves are not unique identified. This makes for fast mixing and exploration of
the posterior space but renders direct interpretation essentially impossible. BART’s
power to estimate comes at the cost of lacking easily interpretable parameters that
relate predictors to outcomes, such as a regression coe cient, for example.
Users of BART thus rely on predictions. Hill (2011) makes the case to use output
from BART to calculate the treatment e↵ects of interest. This chapter does the
same. Let ⌧l and ⌧h be two levels of foreign aid to calculate the first di↵erence in
order to obtain the treatment e↵ect. Relatedly, let ND>⌧h and ND<⌧l be the sets of
observations which received more than ⌧h and less than ⌧l in foreign aid, respectively.
Specifically, this gives rise to the following three estimands that are familiar from



















  [f(D = ⌧h, Xi)]    [f(D = ⌧l;Xi)]
The sample-average treatment e↵ect (SATE) provides an estimate of how chang-
ing the level of aid from ⌧l to ⌧h a↵ects the probability of the outcome (killings,
disappearances, imprisonments) for a random observation in the data. The sample-
avarage treatment e↵ect for the treated (SATT) and for the controls (SATC) do the
same except for a random observation which in reality received more than ⌧h and
less than ⌧l in aid, respectively. It turns out, as will be shown below, that these
distinctions matter little.
The arguments by Besley & Persson (2011), Conrad & DeMeritt (2013), and
Robinson & Torvik (2011) suggest that the e↵ects of unearned revenue (ie. foreign
aid in this chapter) are conditioned by regime type. As BART naturally produces
such estimates as well, I also provide corresponding conditional average treatments
e↵ects, CATE, CATT, and CATC. Specifically, I average the simulated e↵ects over
the observations for each level of the polity2 scores.
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Last, we need to set the values for ⌧ to calculate the treatment e↵ects. Through-
out, I will compare increasing each of the three variants of aid from (roughly) the
20th percentile to the 80th. Table 4.1 depicts the corresponding levels of each.
Aid measure ⌧l ⌧h
Foreign aid 150 900
Foreign aid per capita 25 85
Foreign aid over Resources 82 490
Table 4.1 : Levels Aid for Treatment. Values for foreign aid to calculate SATE,
SATT, SATC, and the corresponding conditional e↵ects.
With variables, models, estimands, and simulation setting specified, we can turn
to the next section to study the results. There are a total of four outcomes and three
variants of the treatment. BART was run for each of these 12 model specifications,
calculating the three estimands for each. Each model was run for a burnin period of
2,000 iterations after which the next 5,000 were saved. All subsequent analysis are
based on these latter.12
12 Convergence was assessed using running-mean plots for a random half of the in-sample pre-
dictions which are shown in the appendix to this chapter (Figure 4.6). Since the variance of
the error term is fixed at one, there is no parameter in BART which is by itself identified (see
CGM). Therefore, convergence diagnostics cannot be applied to the parameters. However, we
can judge whether the estimated output shows signs of non-convergence.
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4.4 Results
This section presents the estimates for the various treatment e↵ects just defined. I
will first examine the treatment e↵ects across the sample, then those conditional on






















































Figure 4.1 : Sample Treatment E↵ects for Foreign Aid on Removal Policies.
Each panel shows the estimated treatment e↵ect (on the abscissa) for a di↵erent
operationalization of aid (ordinate). Each panel refers to one policy. The dot denotes
the median estimate, the line horizontal line the 90% central credible interval. The
di↵erent colors indicate the di↵erent estimands.
Figure 4.1 shows the results for the sample-based e↵ect estimates, with each
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panel belonging to one of the dependent variables. Along the abscissa, the treatment
e↵ect is shown whereas the ordinate labels the operationalization of foreign aid.
Each line represents the 90% central credible interval of the posterior distribution of
the estimate; the dot denotes the median. The vertically stacked lines refer to the
di↵erent estimands as color-coded in the legend to the right.
Consider first the panel for “Genocide/Politicide” for the dependent variable from
(Har↵ 2008). The densities of the treatment e↵ects lie almost entirely on the negative
side regardless of the estimand or the operationalization of foreign aid. However,
the median estimates mostly cling to zero, indicating that raising aid regardless of
its exact measure fails to a↵ect the recipient country’s to engage in genocidal or
politicidal actions. The one exception is that the SATT estimate when for aid as
a fraction of resources is small, but consistently negative. That is, for cases that
received much aid, aid leads to a slight reduction in the probability of engaging in
genocide or politicide.
The negative treatment e↵ects are more pronounced for the extrajudicial killings.
The posterior densities lie essentially entirely on the negative side (except for the
aid volume operationalization) Further, the median estimates are between -.05 to
-.10 percentage-points and thus indicative of substantial reductions in the odds of a
country of a country carrying out frequent extrajudicial killings.
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Turning now to the not necessarily lethal forms of removal, we see that the treat-
ment e↵ects are qualitatively similar. Disappearances by the government exhibit
similar treatment e↵ects as the genocide/politicide. The posterior density is essen-
tially entirely on the negative side, and the median estimates are small. Last, in
contrast to the previous three, the estimates are considerably more noisy so that a
























Figure 4.2 : Conditional Treatment E↵ects for Genocide/Politicide. Each
column of panels denotes the treatment e↵ects for one operationalization of aid,
whereas each row pertains to a specific estimand. Each panel shows the polity2
score on the abscissa and the treatment e↵ect on the ordinate. The thicker line gives
the median causal estimate, whereas the semitransparent polygon the 90% central
credible interval. The horizontal black line denotes no-e↵ect.
Turning now to the conditional treatments, Figures 4.2 through 4.5 show the
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resulting summaries of the posterior densities. Each figure is a 3 ⇥ 3 grid with
columns corresponding to the di↵erent operationalizations of the aid-treatments and
rows to the separate estimands. Each panel graphs the level of the polity2 measure
on the abscissa and the treatment e↵ect on the ordinate. The light gray polygon
























Figure 4.3 : Conditional Treatment E↵ects for Extrajudicial Killings. See
the caption to Figure 4.2 for more details.
The figures reveal that the results from the unconditional estimates broadly hold
even when conditioned on the polity2 score. The estimates for the e↵ect of aid on
political imprisonment is noisy around zero (Figure 4.5), extrajudicial killings are

























Figure 4.4 : Conditional Treatment E↵ects for Disapearances. See the caption
to Figure 4.2 for more details.
disappearances as well as genocides/politicides are slightly reduced (Figures 4.4 and
4.2). A few di↵erences are worth emphasizing specifically.
4.5 Conclusion
The causal estimates of the e↵ect of a big increase in foreign aid, either in its value,
as a share of the governmental resources, or per capita, leads unexpectedly to a
reduction in the recipient government’s e↵orts to remove citizens from political life.
Where does this leave the literature on foreign aid and its e↵ects political violence

























Figure 4.5 : Conditional Treatment E↵ects for Political Imprisonment. See
the caption to Figure 4.2 for more details.
Building mainly on the work by Besley & Persson (2011) and Esteban, Morelli &
Rohner (2010), this chapter corroborates the empirical findings by Carnegie, Aronow
& Marinov (2012). These authors exploit a natural experiment to estimate the treat-
ment e↵ect of foreign aid by the European Union. Castigating instrumental variables
as often lacking credibility, they propose considering the rotation mechanism of the
presidency of the European Council. They show that the EU member which holds
the president can largely set the agenda; if that country happens to be a former
colonial master, aid to former colonies increases substantively. They find that such
EU aid significantly, but only in the short run, increases the recipient’s score on
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democracy and governance. They measure the latter using the (aggregated) CIRI
scores.
Whereas this chapter unexpectedly finds a negative e↵ect of aid on governmental
violence and Carnegie, Aronow & Marinov (2012) find the same without deeper the-
oretical arguments, others have presented the positive relationship that this chapter
expected. Besley & Persson (2011) use membership on the UN Security Council as
an instrument for aid increase with which they are trying to capture hikes in un-
earned revenue. However, this inferential approach has come under critique. Just as
Besley & Persson (2011), Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2010b) assume that mem-
bers of the UN Security Council receive more aid from donors and then find that
non-permanent UNSC members increase repression (Besley & Persson 2011) and
experience less press freedom, less economic growth, and lower democracy scores
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010b). Bashir & Lim (2012) question the workings of
the instruments as rotating UNSC members may on average receive more aid, but
not all do; yet, there were pernicious consequences of UNSC memberships for those
without the aid-increase as well. This critique echoes what led Carnegie, Aronow &
Marinov (2012) to leverage a natural experiment to circumvent issues with instru-
ments.
What can we make of these discrepancies between theoretical arguments and
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findings? Clues may be had by zooming out and considering what the larger literature
on foreign aid and the outbreak of violence suggests. Savun & Tirone (2012) argue
that foreign aid acts as insurance against negative economic shocks, which dampens
commitment problems. Relatedly, Nielsen et al. (2010) show that shocks in aid may
generate precisely such commitment problems. However, such commitment problems
do not feature in the models by Besley & Persson (2011) and Esteban, Morelli &
Rohner (2010). Therefore, more theorizing about the connection between the nature
of resources and violence seems to be necessary.
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4.6 Appendix




















Figure 4.6 : Running Mean Plot for random Sample of In-sample Predic-
tions. Each panel shows the running mean of simulated in-sample predictions for
random half of the observations. The abscissa gives the iteration, the ordinate the
value. Each row of panels belongs to one operationalization of aid, each column




This dissertation adds to the growing literature that supports the notion that aid
is a political phenomenon through and through, and that to understand it, scholars
need to treat it as such. The idea that presumably good things follow immediately
from presumably good intentions is belied not only by this dissertation, but by a host
of research before it. However, unlike some previous work, trying good intentions
as mere cheap talk is mistaken as well. The genuine empathy for human misery
elsewhere may have its e↵ects, but the ramifications are bound to look di↵erently
from what the proponents thereof may envision.
Chapters 2 and 3 highlight in particular this aspect. Each chapter focuses on how
di↵erent interests in foreign aid–the selfish and the selfless–a↵ect the aid we observe.
The main implications for future research come from the idea that the interplay
between selfish and selfless interests drive foreign aid as developed most thoroughly
in Chapter 2. Whereas a coherent fusion of these two age-old views on foreign aid is
a novelty in this literature and should lead to a slew of new research as I will outline
shortly, there exists a conceptual predecessor in the literature on the economics
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of regulation which is worth considering. Yandle (1983, 2007) developed the so-
called baptists-and-bootleggers corollary to the classic theory of regulatory capture.
He argues that governmental regulations are not only influenced or even sought by
particular companies that would be subject to the eventual regulation, but that there
are also those who provide rhetorical, moral cover for the regulation. Harkening back
to the era of prohibition in the United States, Yandle points out that there are always
two groups that take an interest in governmental regulation, the baptists and the
bootleggers. The baptists make an emotional and moral appeal that the regulation
is the “right thing to do,” whereas the bootleggers may not speak up, but stand to
gain from the regulation. The real-life baptists condemned drinking for allegedly
corrupting the moral bases of society, whereas the real-life bootleggers profited from
prohibition as the price for their goods rose (Yandle 2007). The bootleggers gained
from the presence of baptists in that the baptists would fight calls for an end of
prohibition. Any opponent to prohibition would have to overcome the normatively
charged opposition of the baptists, which secured the bootleggers’ rents.
The most exciting new research that this dissertation enables lies in considering
the complementary, perhaps even collusive, societal forces behind foreign aid and
how those may a↵ect the working of foreign aid. Whereas the dissertation left the
selfish and bootleggers ’ and selfless and baptists ’ interests very general, further gains
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are to be had by considering in more details the actors and preferences of the various
baptists and bootleggers in the development world.
With this angle in mind, let me sketch some of the possible venues for future
research, which lead to shining light on phenomena that have received little interest
and revisions of previous stances.
• Recent research has examined how features of aid beyond its monetary volume
alter the e↵ects that aid has (e.g. Nielsen et al. 2010, Girod 2012, Heinrich
& Kobayashi 2013a). If the features matter for e↵ects and outcomes, then a
better understanding of what gives rise to these features should be important.
It should be a promising endeavor to study aid agreements as being designed by
governments (Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal 2001). Similar e↵orts to understand
the deliberate crafting of detailed features of other policies are appearing not
only in foreign aid (Winters 2010, Dietrich 2012, Winters & Martinez 2012,
Schneider & Tobin 2013, Heinrich & Kobayashi 2013b), but also in the research
on bilateral investments treaties (Allee & Peinhardt 2010) and on military
alliances (Mattes 2012a,b). Chapter 3 of this dissertation o↵ers one example
for how these heterogeneous motives for foreign aid can generate changes in
features of aid. Other aspects, such as channels of delivery, conditions, the
number and sizes of projects, among others, seem ripe for an analysis from this
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angle.
• It has long been an idea in the aid literature that robust public support for
foreign aid program are necessary for a donor to provide aid to a meaningful
degree (e.g. Lancaster 2007). However, two questions immediately arise when
we apply the baptist/bootlegger and selfish/selfless lens to this claim. First,
if aid just serves to buy policy concessions, Chapter 2 suggests that public
support may be irrelevant for the level of aid. The claim about the necessity of
public support should therefore not hold in these cases. Second, is more public
support strictly “better” from the point of view of these pushing for greater
support? The answer, suggested at the end of Chapter 2, is that this need not
be the case. Greater public support may increase the marginal benefits of aid to
the decision-maker so that it becomes worthwhile buying a policy concessions,
which, by results from Bearce & Tirone (2010) and Girod (2012), undermine
the sought-after e↵ects. Scholarship should try to determine how such e↵ects
could be mitigated or how proponents of development may counteract them.
This quick discussion shows that there is plenty of room for a (re)examination
of the interplay between public opinion and foreign aid from the point of view
of political economy.
• The baptist/bootlegger and selfish/selfless lens also leads to a study of aid
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and development rhetoric as a deliberate choice. There is scant prior work
thus far. Easterly (2010) examines the language used by aid practitioners,
showing how it systematically lacks notions of accountability.1 van der Veen
(2011) conceives of governments as “frame entrepreneurs” that tweak the public
perception on foreign aid. This idea could be taken further by considering how
donors manage rhetoric over each recipient country. This dissertation would
suggest that aid-for-policy deals, as they are generally less appreciated by the
public, should entail rhetorical obfuscation, silence, or distraction, whereas aid
given to countries that su↵er natural disasters should be extensively extolled. It
seems that this research angle is ripe for much further work, in particular with
the increasing popularity of treating text as data (Monroe & Schrodt 2008).
Foreign aid is a policy with much at stake for those at the receiving end and,
essentially, little for those authorizing and paying for it. As entrenched as foreign
aid is nowadays, it should be an imperative to develop a better handle on the intended
and unintended as well as on the desirable and undesirable workings of foreign aid.
Only with such knowledge could aid be tweaked to better serve those from whom it
is ostensibly intended. I hope the reader of this dissertation walks away believing
1 See also the AidSpeak Dictionary that Easterly compiled from Tweets; see http://
williameasterly.org/the-aidspeak-dictionary/ [accessed March 20, 2013].
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that the previous pages contributed a bit to an improved understanding.
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